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ABSTRACT
The focus of this thesis is an overview of the treatment of German prisoners of
war held in the United Stated during World War n and an examination of the Army’s
efforts to stem Nazi influence over the prisoners through an imaginative, though
questionably legal, re-education program based on teaching o f democracy. The lessons
of American history, presented by a group o f dedicated scholars, served as the
cornerstone of the program which has been described as an unique experiment in political
reprogramming.
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RE-EDUCATION OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II

INTRODUCTION
"Prisoners of war do not figure as largely in the scholarly or the popular history
of World War n as their numbers might warrant."1 Millions of men were taken
prisoner by all sides during World War II; exact numbers are hard to determine. Rough
estimates reflect some eight million prisoners taken by the Germans, three million each
by Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and four million by the United States. Of the
last, 427,000 were interned on American soil: nearly 372,000 were German soldiers,
50,000 Italian, and 5,000 Japanese.2 Hollywood has glamorized the plight and courage
of Allied prisoners of war in movies such as the award-winning Stalag 17 and the
adventure-packed The Great Escape. Except for two relatively recent made-for-television
movies and a few focused scholarly works, little is extant on the fate of Axis prisoners
in the United States.
Italy capitulated in September 1943 and soon thereafter declared war on the Third
Reich. With Italy as a co-belligerent, the status of the Italian prisoners of war held in
the United States changed.

Though still under restrictions to insure personal safety,

health, and well-being, the majority of the Italian "former" prisoners o f war were formed
into service battalions, given considerable freedom (work without guards, passes into
nearby civilian communities, etc.), and employed in work related directly to military

1 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of War in a New England
Village (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985), 3.
2 Ibid.

2

3
operations. The Italians, except for a small number of truly unrepentant Fascists, for all
intents and purposes, ceased to be prisoners of war.3
The estimate of 5,000 Japanese prisoners of war noted earlier reflects a total
towards the end of the war. The number seems incongruous when compared with the
thousands of German and Italian prisoners in the United States. The paucity reflects the
temper of the war in the Pacific theater. During the first three years of World War II,
the number of Japanese prisoners in the United States never exceeded 120.4 In reality,
the nature of the enemy in the Pacific theater and the attitude of Allied forces towards
the Japanese, described by some historians as bordering on rabid racism, resulted in few
Japanese soldiers ever finding their way to prisoner camps.5 "Neither Allied fighting
men nor their commanders wanted many POW’s," wrote historian John W. Dower.
"This was not official policy . . . but over wide reaches of the Asian battleground it was
every day practice. The Marine battle cry at Tarawa made no bone about this: ’Kill the
Jap bastards! Take no prisoners!’"6
The U. S. Army was initially content to confine the German prisoners of war in
secure good order and to take full advantage of their labor potential.

The Army

3 George G. Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the
United States Army 1776-1945 (Washington, D .C.: Government Printing Office, 1955).
93. Hereafter cited as: Lewis, Utilization History.
4 Edward J. Pluth, The Administration and Operation of German Prisoner of War
Camps in the United States During World War II [PhD. diss.](Ball State University,
1970), p. 438. Hereafter cited as: Pluth, Administration and Operation.
5 In military lexicon, holding areas for prisoners of war in the immediate combat
area, usually temporary barbed-wire enclosures, are called "cages."
6 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific W ar (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 68.
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discovered belatedly and much to its chagrin and embarrassment that the Nazi ideology
the Allies were fighting to destroy in Europe was flourishing in many of the prisoner of
war camps on America’s own shores. Hardcore Nazis controlled life inside the wire in
a number of camps.
The focus of this thesis is an overview of the handling o f German prisoners of
war in the United States during World War II and an examination o f the Army’s efforts
to stem Nazi influence and control over the prisoners through an imaginative, though
questionably legal, re-education program based on teaching the principles of democracy.
The re-education program has been described as an unique experiment in political
reprogramming.7

7 Judith M. Gansburg, Stalag: U.S.A. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
1977), 6.

CHAPTER I

GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE UNITED STATES - AN OVERVIEW

Evolution of Prisoner o f War Policy
"The United States Government, even in its infancy, accepted the customs of
nations and sought to apply the concepts of international law to its prisoners o f w ar.Ml
The American wars of the late eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries (with the exception
of the Indian campaigns) were fought, generally, under a mutually accepted code of
honor. Prisoners were usually exchanged or paroled.
This practice changed mid-way through the Civil War when for the first time in
its history, the United States Army found itself faced with the custody and administration
of huge numbers of prisoners of war. Action instituted early in the Civil W ar formalized
the exchange of Union and Confederate prisoners. Execution of a formal accord posed
a problem for the Federal government since the government of the United States refused
to enter into any agreement which would signify recognition of the Confederacy as a
sovereign power.

The government maintained that "the opposition represented a

rebellion against constituted authority and had no existence under law. Hence its leaders
and all who supported them were considered to be engaged in treasonable activities and

1 Lewis, Utilization History. 1.
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if captured were to be treated as traitors under the penalty of law."2
The Dix-Hill Cartel, signed in July 1862, effectively skirted the recognition issue
and established the rules for the exchange of prisoners for both sides. Interestingly, the
Cartel contained a detailed scale of equivalents for use in any exchange under which a
commanding general was equivalent to 60 privates; noncommissioned officers were worth
two privates; private soldiers were to be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, etc. This
complicated exchange system was never successfully implemented.

Ultimately, the

failure of both sides to live up to the Dix-Hill Cartel resulted in large numbers of
prisoners in both the North and South, who had to be fed, housed, and clothed, suffering
in prolonged enforced idleness in prisoner of war camps.3 To establish some policy for
the handling of prisoners, the U. S. War Department issued General Order Number 100
in 1863 which established rules for such matters as treatment of wounded prisoners,
housing, food, and recreation. General Order 100 served as a guide for later policies
relating to the treatment of prisoners by United States forces.4
The Civil War marked the advent of modem war. With modem war came severe
demands on a belligerent’s manpower to support large field armies and critical war
industries.

Neither side made a concerted effort to take advantage of the labor pool

represented by the large numbers of prisoners being held. The labor intensive nature of
modem warfare, coupled with recognition o f the labor potential o f large numbers of

2 Ibid., 27.
3 Ibid., 29.
4 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 4.
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prisoners of war and the fact that any exchanged prisoners, though prohibited from taking
up arms again, could serve in an enemy’s war industry, effectively ended the large
exchanges of prisoners in wars occurring after the turn of the century.5
"The Hague Convention of 1899 Respecting the Laws and Customs of W ar on
Land" was the first international protocol which addressed specifically the treatment of
prisoners of war. It outlined both the duties of captor and the prisoner. The protocol
specifically provided that a captor could employ prisoner of war labor. Twenty-four
nations, including the United States, adopted and ratified the agreement. It was modified
to correct deficiencies in 1907. During World War I, the United States "complied fully
with the provisions of the Hague Convention o f 1907. "6
World War I revealed glaring weaknesses in the Hague Convention of 1907. The
most obvious one stemmed from the Convention’s dependence on the nineteenth century
concept of war which had not caught up with the stark realities of modem total warfare.
Because of its demonstrated weaknesses, a growing demand rose for a revision of the
Convention.

Delegates from 47 countries met at Geneva, Switzerland, in 1929 to

reconsider and revise the rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war. The meeting
resulted in the signing of the "Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929." Designed
"to diminish the rigors of war and to mitigate the fate of prisoners," the 97 Articles of
the Convention, addressing such aspects as evacuation of prisoners, prisoner of war
camps, prisoner of war labor, wages, transfer, punishments, the status of sick and
wounded, medical personnel, chaplains, etc., became the guiding document for the

5 Lewis, Utilization History. 47.
6 Ibid., 48
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treatment of prisoners of war during World War II.7
World War II would reveal severe shortcomings in the 1929 Convention just as
World War I had in the old Hague Convention of 1907.

Nonetheless, the Geneva

Convention of 1929 was the "bible" used by the United States in its pre-war planning and
in the Allies’ wartime administration of Axis prisoners of war. This strict adherence to
the Geneva Convention resulted in what appeared to some observers as overly lenient
treatment and "coddling” of prisoners of war: "It is understood that prisoners of war are
coddled and pampered; in fact are being treated with extreme leniency."8 U. S. policy
in the treatment of German prisoners went beyond any convention-bound obligation to
the letter of international law. The primary reason for adopting a generous treatment
policy was the assumption and hope that the Germans would reciprocate in their
treatment of American prisoners.

Senior commanders also hoped that widespread

knowledge of America’s benevolent treatment of prisoners might encourage large scale
German surrenders and a shortening of the war.9
Early in the war, War Department policy called for the transfer of all captured
enemy personnel to the United States. Once any useful tactical intelligence is gleaned
from prisoners, they became a burden on any combat command. Accordingly, official
policy read that the transfer was ordered "to relieve our [America’s] own fighting forces

7 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 8.
8 U. S. Congress. Senate. Senator Frances Thomas Maloney, Democrat from
Connecticut, speaking on Treatment of Prisoners of War in the United States. 78th
Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 1944. Congressional Record. XC, 6832.
9 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of W ar in a New England
Village. 21.
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of the problems of guarding, feeding and housing prisoners of war in the active theater
of operations and to alleviate the critical manpower shortages which existed in the
continental United States."10 Even under this policy, however, by the end of 1942, only
512 German prisoners were interned in the United States.11
United States forces had their first large-scale contact with the German army in
North Africa in 1942.

The mass surrenders that accompanied the Anglo-American

victory there brought the prisoner of war problem to the forefront.

Great Britain,

severely taxed with the burden o f caring for and housing almost a quarter million
German prisoners, pushed the United States to accept custody of 150,000 prisoners to
help alleviate the problem. Though initially reluctant, the United States agreed to the
British proposal, stipulating that the prisoners be sent in 50,000 man increments with a
month’s notice given before the arrival of any increment and that no shipping would be
specifically diverted to carry the German prisoners to the United States.

The dam

opened.12 Traveling on otherwise empty ships, over 120,000 German prisoners entered
confinement in the United States by the end of 1943; a year later there were over
300.000.

At the end of the war with Germany in May 1945, the number peaked at

371.000.13
Security considerations guided early choices for locations of prisoner of war

10 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1989), 40.
11 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 438.
12 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of War in a New England
Village. 17.
13 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 438.
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camps in the United States. The government feared sabotage by escaped prisoners. The
Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal General, charged with the responsibility for all
prisoners o f war, attempted to keep the camps in remote areas of the south and
southwest, far from the defense industries on the East and West coasts.

Many

compounds were established in old Civilian Conservation Corps camps and in unused
areas o f military reservations.
Security ceased to be paramount with the recognition o f the labor value of the
prisoners. The new policy became one of calculated risk - balancing security concerns
with productivity of prisoner labor. It led to the establishment of hundreds of additional
small camps, usually as close to the prisoners’ work sites as possible.14 By the end of
the war, over 500 camps were in operation, spread throughout almost every state in the
Union.15 The calculated risk policy, easing and modifying security measures, proved
to be a fortuitous decision which would enable the country to derive maximum benefit
from the labor potential represented by the large numbers of enemy prisoners shipped to
the United States.

Transition to Incarceration and Daily Life in the Camps
The German prisoners of war sent to the United States during World W ar n may
be divided into three groups: the first 140,000 were made up, generally, of seasoned
soldiers, many from the Africa Korps, captured by British and American forces in North
Africa in 1942 and 1943; the second group consisted o f about 50,000 soldiers captured

14 Lewis, Utilization History. 118.
15 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 436.
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in Italy; those in the third group, numbering about 182,000, were captured between the
Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944 and the fall of the Third Reich in May
1945.16 The contrast between prisoners in the early group and those captured in the
later stages of the war was striking. Some of Germany’s finest soldiers, many dedicated
Nazis, were in the Africa Korps, but, towards the end of the war, Germany scraped the
bottom of the barrel for manpower. Anyone who could shoulder a rifle was sent to the
front including old men, young boys, and the infirm.

In the words of one such

"soldier": "I was drafted to an anti-aircraft battery as a young boy of 15 years . . . .
I was captured on March 26, 1945 when I was 16 about four miles from my home town
and was taken through France to the states . . . besides old men, we were six young boys
like m e."17 A strong dedication to the war and Nazism was not as prevalent in the last
group of prisoners as it was in the earliest group.
The shock of capture and the transition to incarceration are traumatic for any person.
Germans taken prisoner were kept in holding camps in North Africa, Italy or France
before being loaded on to empty troopships which would have otherwise returned to the
States empty.

Anxieties increased during the cramped cross-Atlantic voyage, a trip

marked usually by seasickness, stale air, cramped quarters, boredom, and uncertainty.
The voyage could take two weeks (although one group of German prisoners made the
crossing in six days on the Queen Mary.) Officers and noncommissioned officers did
their best to maintain discipline during the crossing. Cigarettes were usually in short

16 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah. 40.
17 Willi Vogel, letter relating his experiences as a German prisoner of war at Fort
Eustis, Virginia 1945-1946, document on file at the Post Historian’s Office, Fort Eustis,
Virginia.
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supply, but the prisoners found that the ship’s crew was often anxious to trade for any
piece of militaria. Arrival at New York, Norfolk, o r Boston was a source of surprise
and wonder for soldiers who had been told that the Luftwaffe had leveled all the coastal
cities in the States.18
The reception at all ports of entry was similar. At the Hampton Roads port a
team of 500 personnel was required to process each arriving prisoner of war ship. Since
different prisoner groups were to be dispatched to different destinations, a boarding party
met each ship at the Roads before it docked to determine the number of wounded on
board, the number of protected personnel (doctors, medical attendants, chaplains), and
the numbers of officers, noncommissioned officers, and members o f the Kriegsmarine
(German Navy). When the ship docked, prisoners disembarked at a rate of 700 per
hour, wounded prisoners first. At the processing center, all prisoners had a hot shower,
were disinfected along with their uniforms and belongings, photographed, fingerprinted,
had their personnel files completed and then were moved quickly to waiting trains
manned with a mess staff and guards for movement to their internment camps.19 The
initial processing at the port was efficient; however, contact with the American soldiers
involved usually confirmed preconceived Nazi concepts o f a loose, undisciplined
America.

Few of the American soldiers encountered spoke German and the usual

18 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoner of War in America (New York: Stein and
Day, 1979), 16-17.
19 John Lewy, "Prisoners of W ar," Army Transportation Journal. April 1945, 23.
"Roads," in the nautical sense, describes a protected place near shore, not so enclosed
as a harbor, where ships can ride at anchor.
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refugee doctor who could speak the language was open in his contempt for the
Germans.20
Accustomed to being transported in German boxcars, the comfort of the
upholstered-seat American railcars surprised the prisoners. The vastness and richness
of the American countryside through which they traveled enroute to their camps were
further surprises and a source of awe to many. Some thought the vistas a ruse.21 The
camps, many brand new, were another surprise for the German prisoners.

The

government took great care to construct the barracks and other buildings to the same
specifications used for American military construction in strict compliance with the
Geneva Convention.22 One prisoner described the reaction to the accommodations:
"Our mouths fell open in am azem ent. . . double-deck bunks, white sheets, white pillow
cases - everything new! . . . .

In the German army we lay on straw sacks and had a

very rough blanket to cover up with."23 It should be remembered, however, that even
with all the comforts, the camps were still prisons with barbed-wire, guard towers, and
searchlights - a restricted, dictated existence with no certain end.
Each prisoner was given a full issue of military clothing with the uniforms all
marked with "PW" in white letters. "American commitment to the Geneva Convention
extended to granting permission for the Germans to wear Nazi uniforms, decorate

20 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners in a New England Village. 19.
21 Ibid., 19.
22 Based on today’s standards, the buildings appear inadequate. However, it is
interesting to note that the U.S. Army occupied barracks built exactly the same way, and
at the same time, as those for the prisoners of war until the 1980s.
23 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah. 53.
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barracks with swastika flags, use the Hitler salute, and even, in some cases, celebrate
Nazi holidays. "24
German prisoners ate well.

The Geneva convention prescribes that the food

ration allotted prisoners of war should be the same in quantity and quality provided to
soldiers. Most German prisoners gained weight during their confinement in the United
States. The liberal rations provided the prisoners fueled protests over "pampering and
coddling" prisoners.

Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, speaking in the House of

Representatives in early 1945, expressed the concerns o f his constituents:
They see the prisoners day after day. They see . . . frequent accounts of
the good food, cigarettes, and candies enjoyed by the German prisoners
of war. Elaborate menus are printed, many of them showing meat point
requirements higher than those available to American citizens. There is
growing resentment.1,25
Despite such periodic protests from Congress and the complaints by local citizens
in the environs of some of the camps, the government maintained the food ration
supplied German prisoners in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention
throughout the war.

The International Red Cross made periodic checks of the usual

working ration of 5,500 calories per day.

Camp authorities authorized alterations to

meet prisoner tastes, as long as the cost and calorie levels met the limits prescribed.
Potatoes were, by and far, a favorite in camp mess halls; it was estimated that a German
prisoner would consume a pound of potatoes with a meal. One camp commander had

24 Allan V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of War in a New England
Village, 20.
25 U.S. Congress. House. Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat from Florida,
speaking on Stop Pampering Prisoners of War. 79th Cong., 1st sess., February 9,1945.
Congressional Record. XCI,980.
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to have special permission from the Red Cross to double the potato ration and cut the
meat ration as requested by the prisoners.
As soon as the war with Germany ended in May 1945, the government reduced
the daily ration for prisoners to 3,000 calories. The prisoners viewed the reduction as
a result of the United States no longer needing quid pro quo treatment of U. S. prisoners
held in Germany and, unquestionably, that had contributed to the decision to reduce the
rations. The official government position justifying the action cited the facts that the
prisoners were being fed more than they needed (the majority had gained weight in
captivity), that the country was experiencing a food shortage as a result of the massive
amounts of foodstuff being shipped to Allies and the defeated population in Germany.
In addition, a sense of moral outrage and desire for revenge for the horrors discovered
in the liberated concentration camps and the treatment of U. S. soldiers held prisoner by
the Germans had developed. Although, the prisoners protested the reduction, they did
not suffer on the new diet of 3,000 calories per day. They continued to eat better than
their defeated countrymen in Germany.26
The prisoner’s food ration could be supplemented at a canteen maintained at each
camp in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Purchases could be made in the

canteens using coupon books issued against earnings for labor and ration cards. The
canteens served as a recreation center in many camps. Most were well-stocked with
personal items offered at reasonable prices: e .g ., cigarettes, rationed at one pack per day,
were thirteen cents; apple pie or a bottle o f milk sold for ten cents; and a bottle of beer

26 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah. 80-

85.
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was also ten cents. At the end of the war, the government stopped the beer ration, which
had been available to all prisoners in the canteens.27
Once prisoners settled into a camp, work and free time filled their days. Generally,
they worked the same hours as U. S. workers, six days per week, although they could
be required to work 12 hours per day.

More free time activities were available to

prisoners working on military installations where they had the opportunity to become
involved in sports, hobbies, libraries, educational classes, and movies to a greater extent
than their fellow prisoners assigned to isolated work sites in the private sector.

A

number o f colleges and universities in the environs of the camps taught courses to the
prisoners. All German prisoners had access to American newspapers and magazines, as
well as commercial radio broadcasts.

The openness of the media, headlining the

country’s successes along with its military reversals and domestic problems, was a source
of continuing amazement to most prisoners. Nazi elements in many camps attempted to
censor any news heralding reversals for the German armies.28

Prisoner of War Labor
The government’s initial efforts to take advantage of prisoner labor stumbled.
Keeping policy in line with the Geneva Convention was an early hurdle. The United

27 Ibid., 86.
28 Lewis, Utilization History, 156. The College of William and Mary offered
extension courses for German prisoners at Camp Ashby, Virginia; the University of
Virginia taught classes at Camp Pickett, while Randolph-Macon College taught interested
German prisoners at Fort Lee. See: John Hammond Moore, "Hitler’s Wermacht in
Virginia, 1943-1946," The Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography. Vol. 85 (July
1977), 270.

17
States attempted to follow stringently the provisions of the Convention, which required
all prisoners of war, other than officers, to work for the benefit of their captors. Any
such work could not be related directly to war operations, nor could the health and safety
of prisoners be jeopardized. Prisoners were to be paid for their labor. In the absence
of any agreement with enemy powers, the W ar Department set the pay for working
prisoners at 80 cents per day. This was based on the $21 a month paid the U. S. Army
private in 1941.29
Determining work permissible under the rules of the Convention was another
matter. A liberal interpretation of a nation’s efforts in fighting total war could construe
just about any undertaking by people so engaged as relating to military operations. The
Army’s Judge Advocate General adjudicated questionable work proposals. A plan to
employ large numbers of the 150,000 German prisoners scheduled to be transferred by
the British in work on the ALCAN (Alaska-Canada) Highway was squashed. Since the
highway "was a military road undertaken in wartime for military reasons . . ., work
directly and greatly helping the war effort of the United States", any prisoner of war
labor used on it would be in contravention of the Geneva Convention.30
The War Department established the Prisoner of War Employment Board in 1943
to make final decisions on acceptable work assignments for the prisoners.31 Many of
its decisions bordered on "hair-splitting." For example, maintenance and repair work
on military vehicles designed to carry cargo and personnel was permitted, but work on

29 Lewis, Utilization History. 77.
30 Ibid., 87.
31 Ibid., 114.
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vehicles designed to carry combat weapons was not; prisoners could work on gas masks
and camouflage nets, but not repair rifle ranges and bayonet courses; they could
manufacture mechanical parts that could be used in both the civilian and military sectors,
but not parts that were solely for military use. The Board, while mindful o f the impact
of any of its decisions on U. S. prisoners held in Germany, tended to decide that
"anything not specifically forbidden was allowed.”32
Initial plans called for the employment of the prisoners o f war on relatively secure
military installations, filling administrative and menial jobs, thereby freeing U. S.
soldiers for combat. There was no great demand for prisoner labor in the civilian sector
in 1942. By 1943, however, the United States felt the manpower pinch o f a global war.
The demands of the armed services for manpower were great and the high wages paid
by the booming defense industries lured workers away from traditional jobs. Critical
shortages developed in a number of labor-intensive sectors like agriculture and forestry.
Use of the prisoners of war offered a solution to the acute labor shortage.
Complications arose.

Organized labor was an early stumbling block in the

government’s effort to use the prisoner labor pool effectively. Failing to appreciate that
the use of prisoners would alleviate the manpower shortage and could materially shorten
the war, some members of organized labor continued to protest prisoners’ employment.
To accommodate labor’s concerns, the W ar Manpower Commission required local
commanders to give local unions every opportunity to recruit free labor to fill the work
requirements before approving any contracts for prisoner labor. This did not always

32 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners in a New England Village. 24.
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satisfy the unions; protests continued through the end of the war.33
Regardless of complications and stumbling blocks, the percentage of available
prisoners of war who were employed in the United States rose continually once the
decision was made to make maximum use o f their potential.

By 1945, 95.6% of

prisoners of war who could be employed under the terms of the Geneva Convention had
jobs in the private sector or on various military installations.34 The demand for prisoner
contract labor outstripped the supply available to the War Department. Those in the
private sector worked in a wide range of jobs, mostly in those requiring unskilled labor.
The greatest numbers worked in agriculture, food-processing, and forestry. On farms,
they filled the short-fall in the domestic supply of workers, prevented crop loss, and
increased productivity in a time of extreme demands for food. Many farmers had grown
so dependent on prisoner of war labor that the Secretary of Agriculture requested the
delay in repatriation of 14,000 prisoners in 1946 so that they could be used on essential
farm work in the Spring months.35
The use of prisoner of war labor was cost-effective. Estimates combining the
savings realized in their use as replacements for civilians and soldiers on government
installations coupled with the collections for contract work in the private sector range
between $170 and $274 million.36

33 Lewis, Utilization History. 123.
34 Ibid., 171.
35 Ibid., 127.
36 Ibid., 263.
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Camp Security and Discipline
The American officers and enlisted forces assigned to guard German prisoner of
war camps were not of high quality during the early years of the war. Officers were
often assigned the duty as punishment and most enlisted guards were selected from
soldiers unfit for combat duty. The quality of the guard force improved in 1945 when
the Army started assigning returned combat veterans, including a large number of
liberated American prisoners of war. These assignments were a defensive move by the
War Department made in the face of continuing charges of "coddling" prisoners. An
interesting phenomenon occurred with the change in guard personnel. There was an
immediate empathy between many of these former American prisoners of war and their
German charges; perhaps it was the shared experience of captivity that made the new
guards less arbitrary and overbearing than those guards who had never faced combat.37
Discipline in the camps varied from strict to almost lax. In the early years of the
war, the prisoners were over-guarded. By the end of the war, it was common practice
to send large work details out with only one armed guard who might go to sleep during
the day or wander off to shoot crows rather than watch after his charges.

The most

serious incident between German prisoners and American guards occurred on the night
o f July 8, 1945 at a camp at Salina, Utah when a deranged guard fired 250 rounds of
machine-gun fire into the tents of sleeping German prisoners, killing nine and wounding

37 A former German prisoner of war described the attitude: "The Amis [Americans]
showed by their attitude that they wanted to forget and be reconciled. After all, they
implied, you were only doing your duty." See: Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander
(New York: Praeger, 1989), 306.
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History is replete with stories of Allied escapes from prisoner of war camps in
Germany during World War n. The chances of an Allied soldier making his way to
freedom were much greater than those o f any escaped German prisoner in the United
States. While the Allied soldier had to traverse only a few hundred miles, usually with
the assistance of resistance networks established to assist escapees, the German had to
negotiate thousands of miles and an ocean between his camp and home with no
assistance. Though German prisoners of war were under orders to escape, few tried.
There were only 2,222 escapes registered among the 372,000 German prisoners held in
the United States during the war. Most were recaptured within days of their escape.
The most famous escape occurred on December 23, 1944, when 25 Germans tunneled
out of the camp at Papago Park, Arizona. All were recaptured within a month.39 The
Papago Park escape drew heavy criticism, especially from Congressional critics, of the
seeming laxity of the War Department’s prisoner of war program:
The theory of calculated risk should never be used in those camps where
desperate and fanatical Nazis are stationed. I am informed that regardless
of the fact that the camp located near Phoenix, Ariz. confines some of the
worst Nazis and is even known as the Alcatraz of all camps, only one out
of every four guard towers are being manned. As a result of this
inefficiency, the prisoners of war were able to dig a tunnel for some 200
feet under the very eyes of the guards. It took several months to dig this
tunnel. The prisoners were able to dispose of all the dirt from the tunnel
within the camp without being detected.40

38 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of W ar in Utah. 1,77.
39 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America. 119.
40 U. S. Congress. House. Representative Richard F. Harless speaking on German
Prisoners o f War. 79th Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 1945. Congressional Record. XCI,
1278.
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A few escaped German prisoners, always on the FBI "most-wanted" list, remained at
large in the years after the war.41
Although escapes were an annoyance, to realize maximum benefit from the labor
o f the German prisoners, the government had more serious everyday problems in
discipline, control, and productivity to overcome.

The Provost Marshal General

interpreted the Geneva Convention as permitting the detaining power to work prisoners
of war and use reasonable means to force prisoners to comply with any lawful work
order. Officers were not required to work. Noncommissioned officers could only be
employed in supervisory roles if they waived their work exemption in writing.

The

interpretation of the rules allowed camp commanders to apply "administrative pressure,"
withdrawing privileges or restricting diets, to force compliance with any lawful order,
including an order to work.

This evolved quickly into a "no work, no eat" policy;

prisoners refusing to work were confined on a restricted diet of bread and water. The
authorities segregated recalcitrant prisoners who could not be pressured by "bread and
water" or the threat of courts-martial in separate camps and forced them to work for their
own maintenance. Many of the first noncommissioned officers who were assigned as
supervisors, while pretending cooperation, were actually responsible for a number of
work stoppages and slowdowns throughout the system. Maximum productivity resulted
when these supervisors were replaced by more cooperative leaders, the prisoners trained
in the job to be done - be it picking cotton, chopping pulpwood, gutting turkeys, etc.,

41 The record book on escaped German prisoners of war did not close until 1982.
That year, Georg Gaertner, a former sergeant in the Africa Korps who had escaped on
September 21, 1945, surfaced after having lived as an escapee in the United States for
over 37 years. See: Georg Gaertner with Arnold Krammer, Hitler’s Last Soldier in
America (New York: Stein and Day, 1985.)
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and competent American supervisors, other than the guard, were provided for each
project. Despite the problems, and the requirement to pay the prevailing free labor wage
to the government for prisoner of war workers, competition for prisoner labor among
employers was keen.42
Usually, the German prisoners of war feared their own chain of command more
than the ire of their American captors. Content merely to maintain order in the camps,
Americans rarely interfered in the relationships between Germans inside the wire in the
early years of the war. "The Americans wanted their prisoners of war camps to operate
smoothly, even if it meant allowing ardent Nazis to run German affairs inside the camps.
Order became more important than individual rights."43 Consequently, in a majority
of the camps, dedicated Nazis seized control of the prisoner population. The seniority
system in the camps encouraged Nazi control.

The Africa Korps veterans, who

composed the majority of the earliest prisoners of war to arrive in the United States,
tended to maintain their air of confidence and arrogance. These senior Africa Korps
"leaders" were not beyond using intimidation and force to ensure their control when
persuasion and peer pressure failed. Prisoners who demonstrated anti-Nazi leanings or
were overly cooperative with their American captors were often brought before kangaroo
courts or Courts of Honor; some were beaten, forced to commit suicide or murdered
outright. Between September 1943 and April 1944, at least five murders and several
"suicides" were recorded in the camp system. All the victims were prisoners accused

42 Lewis, Utilization History. 103, 151-153.
43 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners o f W ar in a New England
Village, 30.
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of being collaborators or informers. (The United States executed fourteen of the fifteen
prisoners court-martialed and convicted in these incidents after the end of the war.)44
These incidents forced the War Department to recognize the problem of Nazi
control, although the corrective actions instituted were less than spectacular. "The War
Department response to the potential problems inside the camps came with glacial speed
and inappropriate procedures."45 The authorities’ first response was to ask anti-Nazis
to step forward and openly request protection, a plan which demonstrated a total
insensitivity to life inside the wire and bordered on stupidity.

With no significant

guarantees for safety offered, few prisoners were bold enough to step forward. This led
to an erroneous official conclusion that most of the Germans held as prisoners were
Nazis. Under high-level pressure from Congress and the White House to reduce Nazi
influence in the camps, the Army began to segregate prisoners. By 1945, over 4,500
hard-core Nazis had been concentrated in a special camp at Alva, Oklahoma. Anti-Nazis
were segregated at Camp Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Serious
mistakes still occurred in the government’s segregation activity as when SS soldiers were
occasionally assigned to camps designated to hold only anti-Nazis. It wasn’t until 1945
that all camp commanders began to check all incoming prisoners for the telltale SS arm
tattoo.46
Closely after segregation became regular practice the government began a

44 Pluth, Administration and Operation. 317.
45 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners of W ar in a New England
Village. 33.
46 Ibid., 34, 98.
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re-education or "de-Nazification” program. The immediate goal of the program was to
eliminate or at least weaken the hold of the Nazi leadership in the prisoner population.
Again, the prompting of Congress added impetus to the Army’s effort:
O f far-reaching importance is the question of reeducation of prisoners of
war, and there, too, we have fallen down badly . . . our Army seems
frightened to death at the very idea of doing anything to dampen the
fanatical nazi-ism of German prisoners in our care, despite the fact that
there is not a word in the Geneva Convention which forbids
propagandizing prisoners.47
In fact, the Geneva Convention did prohibit a captor from subjecting prisoners of war
to political propaganda or reeducation. In view of this, and to protect U. S. prisoners
in the hands of the Germans, initial reeducation efforts were highly classified.

47 U. S. Congress. House. Representative Sikes speaking on Stop Pampering
Prisoners of War. 79th Cong., 1st sess., February 9,1945. Congressional Record. XCI,
980.

CHAPTER TWO

"INTELLECTUAL DIVERSIONS"

An unnamed Army historian describes the genesis of the unprecedented War
Department program of de-Nazification and re-education during the waning months of
World War II in the following manner:
Early in 1944 representatives of the War Department and the State
Department exchanged opinions informally concerning the advisability of
undertaking discreet measures toward creation among German prisoners
o f war in American custody of the maximum possible understanding of
and sympathy for American traditions, institutions, and ways of life and
t hought . . . . The War Department recognized the presence of 370,000
German prisoners of war as an unprecedented opportunity to develop in
the German citizenry a nucleus of democratic thinking and respect for
America.1
The visionary acumen of government planners this implies is, perhaps, unwarranted.
While some military and other government officials and voices from the private sector,
suggested early in the war that the German prisoner population represented a microcosm
of the German people upon which an experiment in de-Nazification and re-education
could be tested, the Army did not grasp the "opportunity" until the waning months of the
war. A more accurate description of the re-education program’s genesis is that it was
bom from a combination of War Department frustration over the perplexing problem of

1 War Department. Special Studies Division. Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of
W ar. Historical Monograph File 4-4.1. (Washington, D .C .: Office of the Chief of
Military History, November 1, 1945), 1. Hereafter cited as: HMF 4-4.1, Nov. 1,1945.
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continuing Nazi influence and power in the prisoner of war camps, adverse publicity over
the Army’s seeming complacency and inability to stem that Nazi influence, and the vision
of some American thinkers who looked beyond the immediate goal of victory over the
Axis powers to the needs of postwar Europe, and White House pressure. To the Army’s
credit, once it accepted the re-education mission, it approached the program with the
spirit of a crusade, acting with uncharacteristic flexibility, realism, and imagination in
instituting one of the most successful training programs ever created by the military.
Judith Gansburg, in her book, Stalag: U .S .A .. opines that: "The project remains today
a unique experiment in political reprogramming."2

Stemming Nazi Influence - Recognizing the Problem
The Army’s slow comprehension of the problem of Nazi influence in the prisoner
o f war camps and lethargic action to stem that influence can be attributed to a number
of factors. First, for America the World War II prisoner of war experience was unique.
Nothing in the government’s experience had prepared it for managing a prisoner of war
population of such magnitude. Its only recent experience had been during World War
I when roughly 6,000 German prisoners of war, made up o f captured navy personnel,
crews from captured German merchant ships, and various "enemy aliens," were held in
four camps in the United States.3 In comparison, the World W ar II prisoner of war
population exploded to over 400,000 spread throughout the United States in over 500
camps.

Little planning had taken place between the wars for prisoner of war

2 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 6.
3 Allan Kent Powell, Splinters of a Nation: German Prisoners of War in Utah. 14.
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contingencies. As a result, the War Department moved cautiously, establishing policies
and methods largely by trial and error.
A problem must be perceived and understood before it can be solved. Early in
c

' "

the war, the Army did not perceive Nazi power in the camps as a problem.

In the

Army’s view, the German soldiers in the camps were out o f the fight. They received
low priority from an Army whose primary mission was defeating the German Wermacht
in the field, not fighting a political ideology.4 The Provost Marshal General’s Office,
which was responsible for the prisoner of war program, was content to make a
contribution to victory by insuring that its charges remained confined securely in good
order and that the country realized maximum benefit from the labor potential represented
by the prisoner population.
To most Americans during World War II, all Germans were Nazis. It took the
Army many months to realize that "German" and "Nazi" were not synonymous and that
there were many dedicated anti-Nazis among the prisoners of war who were just as
militant in their beliefs as the Nazis.5 Nazi leadership in many camps came from
members of the Afrika Korps who made up the majority of the prisoners first shipped
to the United States in 1943.

The authorities did not realize at first that the early

4 A scathing critique of the Army’s management of the German prisoner of war
program and its blindness to the threat of Nazism in a November 1944 Atlantic Monthly
article underlines the military’s attitude in quoting two American officers: "W e’re not
here to fight Fascism. W e’re here to defeat the enemy .... It is not our business to
change these men’s habits or beliefs or re-educate them. This company has a job to do
and we simply do it in the way which will bring the best results." See: James H. Powers,
"What To Do With German Prisoners of War - The American Muddle," Atlantic
Monthly, vol. 175, no. 3, November 1944, 49.
5 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 57.

shipments of prisoners from North Africa had also included large numbers o f German
soldiers who were not members of the dedicated Afrika Korps, but who were instead
members of the 999th Probationary Division, a unit Hitler had formed with men
considered dangerous to his regime. As a special penal unit, the 999th Division had its
share o f common criminals; however, the majority of its members were political
dissidents - Communists, Social Democrats, etc. For these men service as cannon fodder
for the Afrika Korps had been a ticket out o f a concentration camps.

At the first

opportunity, most members of the 999th surrendered to Allied forces.

The Allies,

however, took no action to separate them from the mass of prisoners that resulted from
Rommel’s collapse in North Africa.6
Conflict arose in the camps housing both the Afrika Korps Nazis and these
anti-Nazis.

When the toll in dead and injured started to rise, the Army began to

comprehend that something was amiss in their camps. The problems appeared to be
caused by the anti-Nazis, but, on investigation of a number of the incidents of violence,
it became apparent that the anti-Nazis were victims not perpetrators.7
While a lack of understanding of the problem contributed to the Army’s lack of
initial success in separating the anti-Nazis from their Nazi tormentors, its strict adherence
to the dictates of the Geneva Convention as a means of insuring reciprocal treatment of
American prisoners o f war held in Germany must also be blamed.

The Geneva

Convention required that a prisoner of war disclose only his "name, rank, and serial

6 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency:
Village. 35-38.
7 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 58.
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number" during interrogation by his captors. Consequently, the War Department was
hesitant in probing too deeply into a prisoner’s political beliefs unless an individual
prisoner volunteered the information. James H. Powers, in his November 1944 Atlantic
Monthly article "What To Do With German Prisoners - The American Muddle,"
chastised the Army for its naivete and timidity in politically screening German prisoners:
Examinations generally take place at tables so near together that any
prisoner wishing to make it plain that he is an anti-Nazi faces another
hurdle. If his fellows hear him making any such declaration, he is a
marked man. To make matters worse, the examination disregards the
issue of his being a Nazi or an anti-Nazi. Interpreters are not permitted
to solicit this information from a prisoner. If he wants to be segregated,
he must volunteer the information - though he frequently does not know
that he must. Such procedure obviously follows an assumption that it
doesn’t matter much what a prisoner’s political views are.8
The Army’s early efforts in segregating anti-Nazi and Nazi prisoners produced
minimal success. When prisoners could be identified as anti-Nazis, they were sent to one
of three camps reserved for them:

Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Camp Campbell,

Kentucky; and Camp McCain, Mississippi.

Nazi extremists were shipped to Alva,

Oklahoma. By September 1944, when the prisoner population reached nearly 325,000,
only 3,392 enlisted men with Nazi sympathies were at Alva. Official estimates, at the
time, indicated that at least 50-60,000 enlisted soldiers with Nazi-leanings slipped through
the Army’s inefficient screening and remained active in the camps.
An unexpected burst o f political violence in a number o f camps caused official
consternation.

Beatings and murders between October 1943 and February 1944

galvanized the W ar Department into renewed action.

In July 1944, a new, more

8 Powers, Atlantic Monthly. 48. At the time the Powers article appeared, the War
Department’s program of re-education/de-Nazification was starting after a conclusion that
the prisoners’ politics did, in fact, matter.
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ambitious segregation directive appeared under which officer prisoners were to be
separated from enlisted prisoners and confined according to two broad categories:
pro-Nazis at Alva, Oklahoma, and non-Nazis at Camp Ruston, Louisiana. All German
non-commissioned officers were to be segregated in seven camps spread throughout the
Service Commands'' respective areas of responsibility. This July 1944 policy guided the
Army’s segregation actions through the end of the war. The new policy’s shortcoming
remained in its execution since decisions were left in the hands of inexperienced camp
commanders.

Many camp commanders looked upon their anti-Nazi prisoners with

disdain while viewing their disciplined and obedient prisoners, who were usually Nazis,
with admiration.

All segregation action and transfers were to take place without

disruption in the maximum use of prisoner of war labor. Since good order and discipline
insured the effectiveness of the labor program, many camp commanders disregarded the
requirement to rid their camps of Nazis.9 Camp commanders frequently used the
Provost Marshal’s directive to rid their camps of trouble-makers, regardless of political
sympathy.
Although the Army was stung by the public outrage over Nazi brutalities in the
prisoner o f war camps, it appeared unconcerned to many observers.

To them, the

solution to the problem appeared to be a concentrated re-education effort designed to
expose the prisoners to the power of political democracy. Victory over Fascism was just
a matter of time in their view and democracy’s worth would be evident by the reality of
that victory. These same Americans believed that even Nazis would come to understand
the obvious benefits of democracy if they were properly educated.

9 Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of W ar in America. 174-188.

The push for
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re-education was strengthened by a belief that post-war Germany would be a political
vacuum in which, if democracy did not fill the void, Communism surely would. An
outspoken advocate of re-education was Gerhart Seger, editor of the German-American
newspaper, Neue-Volkszeitung. Seger’s opinions appeared in the New York Times on
February 24, 1944, in an article entitled "Editor Says Nazis Kill Captives Here": "Nazi
organizations - active in American prison camps - executed five non-conformists
prisoners and threaten post-war democracy in Germany . . . The only answer to the
problem . . . is a program of re-education."10
A committee of prestigious Americans under Seger’s leadership formed in the late
spring of 1944 to push a re-education program. Among the members were: Dr. Monroe
Deutch, vice-president of the University of California; Dr. Henry Smith Leiper of the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ; Louis Lochner, former chief of the Associated
Press Bureau in Berlin; Congressman Howard J. McMurry of Wisconsin; Dr. George
N. Schuster, president of Hunter College; Dorothy Thompson, syndicated columnist; and
Thomas Mann, world famous German author living in exile in the United States.11 In
addition, Professor Warren A. Seavy of Harvard Law School led a team o f Harvard
researchers who throughout the summer and fall of 1944 tried to convince the War
Department of the logic and benefits of a re-education program for the prisoners of war.
After Seavy’s re-education proposal appeared to fall on deaf ears at the War
Department, the Harvard group released its entire correspondence with the War
Department on the subject to the New York Times on November 30, 1944. The expose

10 New York Times. February 24, 1944, 9.
11 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America. 191-192.
\
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in the article heightened Americans’ frustration over the government’s apparent
narrow-minded stubbornness: "He [Stimson] doubts that any such program is workable
[and] . . . believes it would only arouse suspicion and hostility."12 Letters to the editor
advocating and supporting a re-education program appeared with greater frequency
thereafter. Unknown to those exasperated over the government’s intransigence, the War
Department was at work on a classified re-education program for the German prisoners
in the spring of 1944, albeit not voluntarily, but at the prompting of the White House.
As early as March 1943, seeking any method to break the Nazi hold on the
camps, the W ar Department decided that a re-education program, in which the prisoners
would be exposed to the facts of American history and the workings of democracy, might
be in order. The Provost Marshal General, however, considered the plan "inadvisable"
and shelved it without action.13
In early 1944, Dorothy Bromley of the New York Herald Tribune and columnist
Dorothy Thompson, frustrated over the government’s lack of concern and action on the
Nazi problem, took the problem to Eleanor Roosevelt who was shocked and dismayed
over the lack of progress by the Army in controlling the Nazi prisoners. According to
Judith Gansburg, Mrs. Roosevelt took the unusual step of inviting Major Maxwell
McKnight, Chief of the Administrative Section of PW Camp Operations, to dinner at the
White House and then questioned him directly about the situation: "I’ve been hearing
the most horrible stories about all the killings that are going on in our camps with these

12 New York Times. November 30, 1944, 5.
13 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America. 194.
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Nazi prisoners. I was told that you would be able to tell me whether there was truth to
these stories."14
McKnight deferred an answer until he could confer with his superior, the
Assistant Provost Marshal, Brigadier General Blachshear Bryan. Told to hold nothing
back, McKnight had a frank discussion with Mrs. Roosevelt a few days later during
which he detailed the problem. Appalled, she assured McKnight that: "I’ve got to talk
to Franklin. Right in our own backyard, to have these Nazis moved in and controlling
the whole thought process! What do you think that does to us?"15 Mrs. Roosevelt did,
indeed, "talk to Franklin" and the President talked to the Secretaries o f W ar and State.
In a letter dated March 30, 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote the Secretary of
War:
I believe that the problem of creating among the German prisoners in our
hands the most favorable possible attitude toward the United States and its
institutions is worthy of serious and immediate consideration on the part
of our two Departments. In my opinion, it is a most important part of our
problem of post-war security.16
Secretary Stimson replied on April 8, 1944, agreeing with the Secretary of State; he
stressed that any re-education should remain at all times under military control and
reemphasized the objective to be obtained: "Our objective should not be the improbable
one of Americanizing the prisoners, but the feasible one o f imbuing them with respect
for the quality and potency o f American institutions.1'17

14 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 61.
15 Ibid., 62.
16 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, Hull to Stimson, March 30, 1944.
17 Stimson to Hull, April 8, 1944 in ibid.
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Both agreed that the program should be classified because of its possible impact
on American prisoners of war in German hands should the German government become
aware o f it and because of the possible adverse actions from the German prisoners who
were to be subjected to "re-education,” especially the Nazi element still rampant in some
camps.

The Army Chief of Staff assigned the re-education mission to the Provost

Marshal General on May 22, 1944.18
A scrupulous application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention characterized
the Army’s management of the prisoner o f war program during World War n .19 The
press and Congress chastised the Army for "coddling" the prisoners, seeming not to
understand that the government’s strict adherence to the Convention was intentional and
was being publicized in the hope of insuring reciprocal treatment of American prisoners
in enemy hands. In the view of a number o f War Department officials, the re-education
program as envisioned would be a clear violation of the Convention, which prohibited
a capturing power from forcing propaganda on prisoners.

Planners examined and

reexamined the Geneva Convention for a possible loophole.

They finally settled on

Article 17 which states that, "So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual

18 Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Subject:
Reorientation of German Prisoners of War, May 22, 1944 in ibid.
19The Provost Marshal General, Major General Archer L. Lerch, underlined this fact
in a May 1945 article in the American Mercury: "The W ar Department has followed
strictly the terms of this treaty in all orders and directives that it has issued governing
the treatment o f prisoners of war. The Geneva Convention, I might emphasize, is law."
See: Major General Archer L. Lerch, "The Army Reports on Prisoners o f W ar,"
American Mercury, vol. 60, no. 257, May 1945, 537.
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diversions [emphasis added] and sports organized by prisoners of w ar.”20

Their

reasoning was that since the Geneva Convention encouraged "intellectual diversions" and
did not spell out the "what" or "how" such activity was to be "organized by prisoners
o f war," nothing prevented the War Department from selecting the proper subjects and
media!

In typical obfuscatory fashion, the Army’s re-education program became the

"Intellectual Diversion Program." This liberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention
added importance to the secrecy veiling the program.21

Special Projects Branch
The Provost Marshal General established the Special Projects Branch in the
Prisoner of War Division of his staff in the late summer of 1944 to operate the
re-education program which was officially inaugurated on September 6, 1944. In the
preceding six months of planning, the program crystallized sufficiently to allow a
definition in more practical terms:
The prisoners would be given facts objectively presented but so selected
and assembled as to correct misinformation and prejudice surviving Nazi
conditioning. The facts, rather than being forced upon them, would be
made available through such media as literature, motion pictures,

20 W ar Department. Special Studies Division. The Prisoner of War Re-education
Program in the Years 1943-1946 (Draftl. Historical Monograph File 2.3-7.
W ashington,D.C.: Office of the Chief o f Military History, September 1952, 3. Hereafter
cited as: HMF 2.3-7, September 1952.
21 The government carefully protected the sensitivity o f the program before it was
declassified in early June 1945. It is interesting to note that the Provost Marshal General
makes no mention of the "intellectual diversion program" in his May 1945 American
Mercury article other than: "Or perhaps Hans is ambitious, so he attends one of the
classes taught by a fellow prisoner. It may be an English class. Or a class in
mathematics, American literature, American history, art." See: Lerch, American
M ercury. May 1945, 541.
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newspapers, music, art, and educational courses. Two types of facts were
needed: those which would educate the Germans concerning the power
and resources of America and its democracy and those which would
convince them o f the impracticability and viciousness of the Nazi
position.22
The goal was to present a large variety of facts so convincingly, that the German
prisoners would understand and perhaps believe historical truths and values as generally
conceived by Western civilization and to develop an appreciation and respect for the
American people and their values.

Further, it was hoped that upon repatriation the

prisoners might form that hoped-for nucleus of democratic thought in a new Germany
which would reject militarism and totalitarian control.23 Behind these goals of the
re-education program, although unstated, was the sober reality of a possible confrontation
between democracy and communism for dominance of post-war Germany.
Arnold Krammer states that the men assembled in the Special Projects Branch to
run the experimental program "would make any university proud." To head the Branch
the Provost Marshal selected Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davidson, a nationally known
poet, teacher, author, and 1930’s Guggenheim Fellow who had served on the faculties
of the Universities of Colorado and Miami before the war. Walter Schonstedt, a German
novelist who had fled the Nazis, joined the staff as an interpreter and advisor. In quick
order, Davidson recruited Dr. Howard Mumford Jones, the eminent Harvard professor
and President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Dr. Henry Lee Smith J r .,
a language and dialect expert; Robert Richard, an Air Corps officer and former professor
at the University of Colorado; and Robert L. Kunzig, an attorney and instructor at the

22 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 3.
23 Ibid.
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Army’s Information School at Washington and Lee University.

Dr. William G.

Moulton, a famous linguist with experience in military training programs and fluency in
German, and Dr. (Colonel) T. V. Smith, a former congressman from Illinois and
professor at the University o f Chicago, rounded out one o f the most remarkable staffs
ever assembled during the war.24
One of the earliest actions of the Special Projects staff was the creation of a
special camp where the assembled group could brainstorm new programs in complete
secrecy and where selected German prisoners could be assembled to assist and participate
in the program. A former Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Van Eatten, New
York was opened to house the group at the end of October 1944. The camp became
known as "The Factory." Five months later, a more accessible, geographically favorable
location came available and The Factory transferred operations to Fort Phillip Kearney,
a former Coast Artillery Post in Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay.25
For duty at The Factory the Army assembled 85 specially qualified German
prisoners of war who had been under observation for a number o f months by their
respective camp commanders and Army intelligence for duty at The Factory.

These

former professors, writers, linguists, and dedicated anti-Nazis were all volunteers who
received no promises of special treatment or early repatriation.26 Fear of reprisals after
the war worried a number o f these volunteer prisoners. The Army took steps to maintain
their anonymity, concealing the existence o f The Factory by maintaining its mailing

24 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners o f War in America. 65-66.
25 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 12.
26 Ibid.
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address as Fort Niagara, New York, an ordinary anti-Nazi prisoner o f war camp.27 The
prisoners assembled at The Factory included both officers and enlisted ranks.

The

officer prisoners, in an effort to practice the democratic ideals which they hoped to teach
to others and to create an atmosphere where the group could work as equals, started by
renouncing their Wermacht rank.28 Because of their special assignments and careful
background investigations, The Factory prisoners enjoyed more freedom than regular
prisoners of war. There were no guard towers or barbed wire at Fort Kearney. The
prisoners and their American supervisors from the Special Projects Branch, all educated
and cultured men joined together for the same purpose, developed an unique mutual
respect, sense of cooperation and comradeship that would come to be referred to as the
"Kearney spirit."29
The Commanding General of the Army Service Forces announced the "Intellectual
Diversion Program" to his subordinate commanders throughout the United States in a
secret letter on November 9, 1944. The letter, which explained the purpose and goals
o f the program, provides an interesting insight into the Army’s approach to the program
at the action level. Maximum use of prisoner of war labor remained an Army priority:

27 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 67.
28 Each prisoner assigned to The Factory signed an oath which included the following
declaration:'T want to live in an altruistic working community together with the other
inmates of this compound; the utilization and disposition of each o f us should be done
in accordance with our individual talents and accomplishments. The military rank will
be acknowledged within the limits of the Geneva Convention, but the right for special
privileges will be waived as far as our community is concerned." See: National Archives,
Record Group 389, Provost Marshal General (PMG), Special Projects Division,
Administrative Branch, Decimal File, 1943-1946, Box 1616. Hereafter cited as: RG 389,
PMG.

29 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 12-13.
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"A properly conducted reorientation program need not interfere with the priority of work
projects."
Only materials approved by the Provost Marshal’s Special Project Division would
be used.

Considered key was the conduct of the program at camp level where the

program’s action agent would be specifically procured and trained officers:
to be known as the Assistant Executive Officer of the camp. His sole
duties are to foster the program within all compounds of each prisoner of
war camp and its branches and to assist and advise the camp commander
in all matters pertaining to this mission . . . .
He should assist the
Intelligence officer in identifying ardent Nazis and Gestapo agents, and
other incorrigibles whose segregation . . . becomes necessary to the
accomplishment of the program . . . . Officer personnel . . . will be
procured, trained, and assigned . . . by the Provost Marshal General.30
The authorities planned to use any available surrogate to insure success:
War Prisoners’ Aid of the International Young Men’s Christian
Association, the International Red Cross, and other welfare agencies now
well established with prisoner of war camps as far as possible will
continue to be employed as channels for the introduction of Intellectual
Diversion program materials into camps. The security classification of the
program prevents disclosure of its purposes to these agencies.31
While the Special Projects Division wrestled with the problem of locating and
training officers for the key Assistant Executive Officer positions, The Factory staff
organized to provide the materials for the program. The Factory’s German prisoners
divided themselves into the following sections:32
FILM SECTION:
Reviewed films, translated synopses for films,
transcribed radio programs, and recommend policies for the post-war use

30 Ibid.
31 RG 389, PMG, Box 1631. Letter, CG, Army Service Forces to subordinate
Commands, Subject: Intellectual Diversion Program, 9 November 1944.

32 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 13-15.
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of radio and films.
TRANSLATION BUREAU:
Translated surveys taken among the
prisoners from German into English and pamphlets prepared by the Office
of War Information and Special Projects Division from English into
German.
CAMP ADMINISTRATION SECTION: Handled general supervision and
welfare of the prisoners and was headed by the camp spokesman.
REVIEW SECTION: Analyzed, evaluated and made recommendations
concerning all materials submitted by other branches o f the Special
Projects Division and other interested government agencies.
CAMP NEWSPAPER SECTION: Maintained continuous review of all
camp newspapers, made recommendations about content and editorial
policy and gathered material from the papers of possible interest to Army
intelligence.
NATIONAL MAGAZINE SECTION: Prepared a periodical entitled P e r
Ruf (The Calll for the German prisoner population.

P e r Ruf (The Call!
One of the most important missions assigned The Factory was the publication of
P e r Ruf. an eight-page biweekly publication for distribution among the prisoner
population.33 The policy of the paper, as established by the Special Project Division
officers supervising the project and its prisoner o f war editors was:
to create a prisoner of war magazine for the broadest audience possible,
to provide exact news of all important military and political events and
post-war problems, and to print news from the homeland and good
reading material in order to foster realistic thought and constructive
interests and feelings, stimulate the desire for real cultural expression
among the prisoners and to reflect their point of view as far as possible,

33 American prisoners of war held in Germany were subjected to Nazi propaganda
in a weekly newspaper called, O.K. - The Overseas Kid, the only journal of current
events in English made available in the camps. See: "William L. Shirer Writes in the
N.Y. Herald Tribune. ” Reader’s Digest. January 1945, 44.

42
give prisoners moral support and open a larger intellectual horizon for
their benefit, make prisoners conscious of the tasks which await them in
the future and to foster traditions based on the principle o f right,
independent thinking, personal freedom, and in a broader sense - the Four
Freedoms.34
Dr. Gustav Rene Hocke, a prizewinning German writer and novelist, was
editor-in-chief of P e r Ruf at Fort Kearney.35 Since the editors’ prisoner status kept
them from pursuing stories like true journalists, the Office of War Information became
the paper’s "eyes and ears" for background data, reference, and special items of news.
That agency cooperated fully in the publication of the paper. The paper was an excellent
re-education vehicle, tackling contentious issues from the outset. Nazi prisoners often
chided America’s treatment of blacks as being no better than Hitler’s treatment of the
Jews. The first issue contained a lengthy section which discussed the economy of the

34 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 17.
35 Although no promises of special treatment were made to any o f the volunteer
prisoners at The Factory, Hocke received some special considerations after the war
because of his unique history and contributions to the re-education program. Hocke fled
the Gestapo in 1940. Settling in Rome, only to be forced into joining the German
Luftwaffe as a civilian interpreter in Sicily, he was interned by the Allies as a prisoner
o f war in September 1944 and shipped to the United States. He asked to be segregated
as an anti-Nazi and offered his cooperation, ultimately being selected for The Factory.
Hocke’s wife, an Englishwoman, had been in England since 1939. After a great deal of
letter writing, including his wife’s plea to Bess Truman, Hocke was transferred to British
control in early 1946 to edit the British version of a prisoner o f war newspaper, and be
with his family. The Geneva Convention requires a capturing power to return a prisoner
to the country of his nationality or the country in whose army he served. A victorious
United States made an exception in Hocke’s case. See: Letter: Hocke to father-in-law,
Professor Leonard Turner, September 28, 1945; Letter: Mary Hocke to "Mrs. Truman,
The White House, Washington, D .C ., U .S .A .", 14.10.45; Letter: Apostolic Delegate to
Brig. Gen. B.M. Bryan requesting special consideration for Hocke, November 2, 1945;
Teletype order, Provost Marshal General to CG, First Service Command transferring
Hocke to British control effective "0830 hours on 18 January 1946", 11 January 1946.
RG 389, PMG, Box 1616.
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Southern states, their history, geography, and the roots o f slavery.36
P e r Ruf was a sophisticated German-language publication, printed on high quality
paper and liberally illustrated. The first edition appeared in the camp canteens on March
6, 1945; it was priced at a modest five cents per copy. Considerable debate occurred
among members o f the Special Projects Division officers over whether the paper should
be sold or given away free before deciding that the prisoners would be less suspicious
of something they had to purchase. Only 11,000 copies were printed for the first edition,
but, by the fifteenth edition, 75,000 copies were being printed to meet prisoner demand.
Publication ended with the 26th issue on April 1, 1946.37 The paper paid for itself, not
only monetarily, but as a major vehicle in the re-education program.38
Prisoner reaction to P e r Ruf assisted the Assistant Executive Officers in gauging
Nazi strength in their respective camps and tabbing Nazi sympathizers for segregation.
With the first issue, Nazi elements actively attempted to prevent the paper’s distribution.
Over time, their efforts became less pronounced and prisoner reaction to the paper
became an excellent means of judging the shift in attitudes as a result o f the re-education
program.
The Factory element charged with monitoring camp newspapers noted the positive
impact of P e r Ruf and the subtle efforts of the re-education program in surveys
conducted on camp newspapers. An early survey o f about 80 camp newspapers in March

36 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 74.
37 RG 389, PMG, Box 1616. Memorandum, Subject: Liquidation of Factory, dated
21 January 1946.
38 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 19-20.
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1945 revealed that almost half should be classified as Nazi or violently Nazi in both tone
and content. A distinct transition in a number of the papers’ editorial policy and content
occurred over the next six months. By the fall of 1945, a similar survey of the same 80
newspapers showed a shift in prisoners’ attitudes reflected in the papers they produced.
The new survey showed only three newspapers as camouflaged Nazi or militaristic while
24 espoused democracy, 18 were strongly ant-Nazi, 32 non-political, and three
religious.39 A number of elections sponsored by local camp newspapers and P e r Ruf
substantiated the positive trend in attitudes.40

The Film Circuit
At the beginning o f the re-education program, government authorities estimated
that the prisoner of war activities most susceptible to influence were those recreational

39 HMF 4-4.1, November 1, 1945, 25. The fact that Germany surrendered
unconditionally to the Allies in May 1945 may have also contributed to the change in
attitudes reflected in the follow-on survey.
40 A prisoner requested election on the type government preferred for post-war
Germany conducted at Camp Claybome, Louisiana, in November 1945 showed the
following results:
Limited Monarchy
Democracy
Socialism
Communism
Invalid ballots
Did not vote

8
387
44
9
89
25

1.4%
68.9%
8.0%
1.7%
15.6%
4.4%

TOTAL

562

100.00%

See: Letter reporting results of prisoner requested election conducted at Camp Claybome,
Laesione, 19 November 1945, in RG 389, PMG, Box 1616.
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activities "that move more or less in the realm of social ideas." In probable order of
popularity among prisoners were: the motion picture program recreational reading, radio
programs, and theatrical performances.41 The Special Projects Division, recognizing
the power of the motion picture as an information medium, wasted no time in
establishing a regular film circuit and seizing control o f the distribution of films to the
prisoner of war camps.
Before the "Intellectual Diversion" program, the American-made movies rented
by the prisoners with canteen funds had been generally selected by a Nazi minority to
embarrass the United States. The camp spokesman, who selected the movies for viewing
by his fellow prisoners, often opted for films which underlined gangsterism, corrupt
morals, and the decadence o f American life in order to persuade his fellows o f the truth
o f Nazi allegations.

Among the movies most often selected were titles like:

Lady

Scarface, Millionaire Playboy. Miles from Alcatraz. Parole. Dead End. Legion of the
Lawless. W olf M an. and Too Many Blondes.
To counter this, the Special Projects Division put together a list o f motion pictures
which combined excellent documentaries along with a catalog of Hollywood productions
which could be used to underline America’s military and technical power for the
prisoners and imbue in them a respect for American values and leaders. Among the
documentaries on the new list were: Cow Boy. Steel Town. T .V .A .. Rockefeller Center.
Aircraft Carrier. Arctic Passage, and Medicine on Guard.

Hollywood films on the

approved list included: Abe Lincoln in Illinois. Adventures of Tom Sawyer. Back to

41 Letter, CG, Army Service Forces to subordinate commands. Subject: Intellectual
Diversion Program, 9 November 1944 in ibid. Box 1631.
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Bataan, God Is My Co-Pilot. Song o f Bernadette, and the Story o f Alexander Graham
Bell. Gone were the movies glorifying gangsterism, films containing racial slurs, and
depression or slum pictures.
Attendance at movies was voluntary, with prisoners paying 15 cents for a show.
Assistant Executive Officers reported attendance and audience reaction to each movie.
After V-E Day, movies with strong anti-Nazi sentiments were introduced into the system.
Prisoners watched the Why We Fight series and Hollywood productions like:
Confessions of a Nazi Spy. The Hitler Gang. Watch on the Rhine, and Hitler’s Children.
In an attempt to subject the prisoners to a sense o f collective guilt, the War Department
made attendance at special films showing Nazi atrocities and deprivations of the
concentration camps mandatory.

On balance, the results o f the re-education film

program were excellent. Between June 1945 and January 1946, the Special Projects
Division recorded over eight million paid admissions. Like P e r Ruf. while making a
major contribution to the re-education goal, the movie program was self-sufficient,
generating a profit of over $1 million.42

The New World Bookshelf
German prisoners of war organized instructional classes in the camps from the
earliest days of their captivity. While some o f the classes provided the opportunity to

42 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America. 209-211. An initial stumbling block
for the movie program was the resistance of Hollywood moguls who resented the use o f
their films to "coddle” German prisoners. A number, being Jewish, did not look with
favor on anything German. A call from the Secretary of W ar to the Warner brothers,
explaining the nature of the classified re-education program, prompted active
cooperation. See: Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 82.
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build credits which would be accepted in the German educational system, most were run
by the Nazi control groups and were designed to cement Nazi political philosophy. To
the Special Projects Division, the extensive classroom network already in operation
presented a perfect opportunity for democratic indoctrination. Through the Assistant
Executive Officers, the Division hoped to seize control of the classrooms.
Their first step was to censor all books and reading material available in the
camps. Most o f the books provided the prisoners by the German government through
the International Red Cross were tinged with Nazi propaganda. To stem this source,
books arriving from Germany were intercepted and examined in the Customs House in
New York prior to release.

Objectionable tomes somehow got lost in transit to the

camps! The Assistant Executive Officers, after conducting an inventory of their camp
libraries, submitted lists to The Factory’s Review Section which checked the political
content of each book. Referring to a catalog of books approved and disapproved by The
Factory, the Assistant Executive Officers were able to "sanitize" and reorganize their
camp libraries. With the undesirable weeded out, The Factory worked to develop large
quantities of anti-Fascist reading material to fill the void.43
Next, The Factory commissioned a series of purchasable paper-back books for
sale in the camp canteens. The series, eventually totalling 24 titles, was known as the
Bucherreihe Neue Welt (New World Bookshelf). The first books printed in the series
included works of German authors who had been banned by Hitler:

e.g., Thomas

Mann’s Achtung Europe (Attention Europe). P e r Zauber Berg (The Magic Mountain.
Volumes I and ID. and Lotte in Weimar (Lotte in Weimar): Franz W erfel’s Das Lied von

43 Krammer, Nazi Prisoner of W ar in America. 206-207.
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Bernadette (Song of Bernadette). and Heinrich Heine’s Meisterwerke in Vers und Prosa
(Masterworks in Verse and Prosed. German translations of Stephen Vincent Benet’s
America. Wendell Wilkie’s One W orld, and works by Joseph Conrad and Ernest
Hemingway followed. The series was immensely popular among the prisoners.44
In addition to the publication o f the literary works on the New World Bookshelf.
The Factory published a number of German language pamphlets on its own. One which
was immediately popular as a souvenir and text for study was entitled, Kleiner Fuhrer
durch Amerika (A Brief Guide Through America').

The pamphlet describes the

geography, natural resources, history, and institutions of the United States. Dr. Howard
Mumford Jones, its author, wrote three additional pamphlets for sale in the camp
canteens: Eine Einfuhrung in das Amerikanisch Schulwesen (An Introduction to
American Schools). Eine Einfuhrung in die Amerikanisch Verfassung und Verwaltung
(An Introduction to American Government), and Kurze Geschichte der Vereinigten
Staaten (A Brief History of the United States). Published with both German and English

44 Other books in the series included: P e r Freibeuter (Freebooters) by Joseph
Conrad, Redetzkmarsch (The March of Radetzkv) by Joseph Roth, Die Rauberbande
(The March of Outlaws) by Leonhard Frank, Die Schoensten Erzaehlugen (Best Tales'!
by Deutsche Romantiker, P e r Hauptmann V. Koepenick (Captain Von Koepenick) by
Karl Zuckmeyer, Briefe Deutscher Musiker (Letters of German Musicians) by Alfred
Einstein, Im Weston Nichts Neuss (All Quiet on The Western Front) by Erich Maria
Remargue, Die 40 Tage des Musa Dagh I und II (The 40 Days of Musa Dagh I and ID
by Franz Werfel, Der Streight urn den Sergeanten Grisha (The Struggle for Sergeant
Grisha) by Arnold Zweig, Liebe und Tod auf Bali (Love and Death in Bali) by Vicki
Baum, Ein Bauer aus dom Taunus (A Peasant from Taunus) by Carl Zuckmayer,
Menschliche Komoedie (The Human Comedy) by William Saroyan. RG 389, Box 1613,
Interim Report of the Orientation Branch, 28 February 1946. Willi Vogel, a former
German prisoner at Fort Eustis, Virginia, appended a xeroxed copy o f the cover of a
canteen-purchased book - Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass - to a letter in which he
recounts his experiences as a prisoner of war at Fort Eustis. See: Letter, Willi Vogel
to Mrs. Shepard, Fort Eustis Historian’s Office, July 17, 198(illegible), on file at the
Historian’s Office, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
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texts, these books served a dual purpose in providing information to a growing number
of interested prisoners and improving their English which was stressed after V-E Day in
all dealings with prisoners of war. By the fall o f 1945, the Special Projects Division,
working closely with the camp Assistant Executive Officers, filled the prisoners’ thirst
for reading material with books and pamphlets, selected and designed specially to create
democratic ideas and thought.45

"Intellectual Diversions” Program
Armed with Der Ruf. an excellent and popular movie program, and specially
tailored reading lists provided by the Special Projects Division and The Factory, each
Assistant Executive Officer had to find the right moment and method to move for control
of the classes in his respective camp. His first task was to identify and isolate the Nazi
leadership in the camp, a task made easier by victory over Germany in May 1945 which

45 RMG 389, PMG, Box 1649. Memorandum for Director, Special Projects Division,
PMGO: Subject: Reorientation Program for German Prisoners of War, 31 May 1945.
In view of the prisoners wont to chide authorities over racial practices in the United
States, Dr. Jones attempts to address the problem in a balanced fashion in his pamphlet.
The section entitled "Minorities" states, in part:
According to the Constitution, all minorities should enjoy the same rights
as the original immigrants who, coming mostly from Great Britain, have
lived in this country in their descendants for centuries. Such principles
were put into practice slowly. Up to about 1885 the Indians were
considered a danger. Many of them died in campaigns o f annihilation ...
a definite change has taken place .... Although slavery was abolished
after the Civil War, the Negroes have nevertheless not acquired full
economic and political equality in all parts o f the country .... Negroes
have made decisive progress .... However, there can be no doubt that,
so far as the equality of the colored people is concerned, there is much to
be done ... conflicts between colored and white people are not yet
resolved.
in ibid. Box 1634 (File 350-General). See: Draft, A Little Guide Book to the United
States by Howard Mumford Jones.
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sped the downfall o f Nazi leadership in most camps.

Working with co-operative

prisoners who often rose to leadership in the compounds, the Assistant Executive Officer
was able to organize and rearrange classes to emphasize the subjects needed for
successful "intellectual diversion." English became a mandatory subject. While civics
and geography gained popularity as elective courses, the most important means used to
teach democratic thought was American history:
American history was considered the best vehicle for teaching democratic
life - not teaching history as history, but by teaching history as a strategy
of democratic living. The national story was told in its most dramatic and
moral form: dramatic to keep the interest despite language problems, and
moral to give them faith that what they learned would be applicable to the
German condition.46
The Special Projects Division recruited universities and colleges near the camps to
support the program with additional courses in order to add excitement and expose the
prisoners to the excellence of American higher education.
The "Intellectual Diversions Program" continued through the final repatriation of
the prisoners in 1946. Its long range impact has never been judged and it is doubtful that
any scientific assessment can be made. Nonetheless, it was a noble experiment which
touched the lives of almost every prisoner of war held in the United States during World
War II.

With the program firmly in the hands o f the system’s Assistant Executive

Officers, the Special Projects Division and The Factory turned attention and energy to
a concentrated re-education effort for approximately 25,000 anti-Nazi prisoners of war
selected for early repatriation to assist the United States Military Government in occupied
Germany.

46 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 94-95.

CHAPTER THREE

SPECIAL PROJECTS

Project II and Project III
With victory in Europe on the horizon in early 1945, the Army realized that
reliable, trained Germans would be required to augment military government to
administer the U. S. zone of occupation effectively. Recognizing the potential in the
prisoner of war population to meet these requirements, the Provost Marshal’s Special
Projects Division chaired a meeting in late February 1945 among representatives of the
Army staff and a group of 12 prisoners o f war (members of The Factory representing
various professions) to determine how best to take advantage o f that potential.

The

recommendations from that meeting prompted establishment in July 1945 of the "United
States Army School Center", consisting of an Administrative School at Fort Getty, Rhode
Island, referred to as Project II, and a Police School at Fort Wetherill, Rhode Island,
known as Project III. The proximity of Forts Getty and Wetherill to The Factory at Fort
Kearney, on Narragansett Bay, eased coordination o f operations.1

1 W ar Department. Special Studies Division. Re-education of Enemy Prisoners of
War. Projects II and III. Historical Monograph File 4-4.1 (Washington, D .C .: Office of
the Chief of Military History, 1 March 1946). 1,3,6. - Hereafter cited as HMF 4-4.1,
March 1, 1946. The Army established a third school (Code-named "Sunflower") to train
desirable prisoners of war still held in Europe in administration in Querqueville, France
during the summer of 1945. See: RG 389, Box 1654 (Project I and II - Europe), History
o f Sunflower Project, Chateau Tacqueville, undated.
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Prior to the formal opening of Projects II and III, the Special Projects Division
conducted an experiment in administrative training during the late spring and early
summer of 1945 at Fort Kearney under the direction of Dr. Howard Mumford Jones.
Dr. Jones served as the experimental school’s director and principal instructor in
American History and Institutions. Dr. Henry W. Ehrmann taught German History;
Major Burnham N. Smith, a former professor at Brown and Columbia, handled classes
in Military Government; and Major Henry L. Smith Jr. and Dr. William Moulton
shepherded instruction in the English language. Guest lecturers appeared periodically
during the experiment to augment the faculty’s efforts.2
The curriculum designed for the eight-week experimental school sought to
inculcate in the students a general appreciation of the principles of democracy, to provide
an outline of the organization, functions, and plans of military government in occupied
Germany, and to improve and hone English language skills. The lessons learned during
the experiment with 101 prisoner-students provided the cornerstone curriculum of the
formal Project II and III classes which began on July 19, 1945.

Absorbing the ten

officer and civilian instructors of the experimental school, the Center’s staff and faculty
expanded to an authorized strength of 58 officers, 115 enlisted men and 12 civilians for

2 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on The Experimental Administrative School for
Selected German Prisoners of War, undated. 1-2. Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale
delivered three lectures on German political history and his impressions on American
life; Professor Robert Ulich of Harvard lectured on what needed to be done in German
education; and Professor Karl Vietor, also of Harvard, lectured on Goethe and the
cosmopolitanism of Germany in Goethe’s time.
Ten prisoners from the experimental class were shipped to Europe on June 25, 1945
to assist at the Administrative School being established at Querqueville, France. See:
Ibid. Box 1632 (File 350, General) Memorandum, PMG to ACofS,G l, Progress Report,
Reorientation o f German Prisoners of War, September 1945, 11.
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operations.3
Teams of Special Project Division staff fanned out during the summer o f 1945,
visiting all base camps and 250 branch camps in the system to select suitable prisoner
personnel for training in Projects II and HI.

The teams interviewed prospective

candidates based on recommendations o f their respective camp commanders and
intelligence officers. Prisoners of war from the Factory assisted in the selection process.
Student candidates were tested individually at their own camps and then in groups at Fort
Devens, Massachusetts before being posted to Administrative School at Fort Getty or
Police School at Fort Wetherill.

The testing process, supervised by Dr. Henry W.

Ehrmann, who had fled Hitler’s Germany and served as a civilian expert on the Special
Projects Division staff and principal instructor in German history, had a threefold
purpose.

The tests were designed to assess each candidate’s general knowledge,

intelligence level, and political attitude, and to check the veracity of a candidate’s own
statements about his education and political beliefs, and to determine whether the selected
prisoner should be trained in administration or police work.

O f the 17,833 prisoners

screened between 19 June and 17 August 1945, only 816 were accepted as suitable for
administrative training and 2,895 for the police school.4 A profile of those selected
reflects a group with strong capabilities:

43% were university graduates, 25% were

3 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946. 2, 6.
4 Ibid., Box 1632 (File 350, General). Memorandum: PMG to ACofS, G l, Subject:
Progress Report, Reorientation of German Prisoners of W ar, September 1945, 11.
The answers given on the written tests during the screening process were used later
by the schools’ staff and faculty as a double-check on students’ honesty and intelligence.
See Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 121.
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former businessmen or white-collar workers, and 10% former German civil servants.5
Experience at Fort Kearney during the experiment underlined the importance of
training in English as a basis for the production of men capable o f cooperation with
military government in Germany. Dr. Jones highlighted this fact in his report on the
experimental school, stating that, "Central to the whole school is training in English.
Unless this is carefully done, teaching is crippled.

Almost invariably prisoners

unsatisfactory in other respects were in the first instance unsatisfactory in English. "6
Interestingly, at about the same time, the importance of English in post-war Germany
was recognized by the Army in a Provost Marshal General directive stressing:
It is extremely desirable that every German prisoner of war in the United
States be taught to speak, read, and understand the English language.
Although this provision is not made mandatory upon the prisoners, every
available effort will be made within the camps to see that English is taught
and that the prisoners are forced by circumstances to learn English.7
Based on the language training experience gleaned from the classes for the 101
prisoner-students in Dr. Jones’s Kearney experiment, the Language Department for
Projects II and III was compelled to organize in a more elaborate fashion than other
faculty departments.

Depending on their degree of proficiency in English,

5 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 122.
6 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on The Experimental Administrative School for
Selected German Prisoners of War, undated. 7.
7 Ibid., Box 1634 (file 350 - General). Memorandum for Director, Special Projects
Division, PMGO. Subject: Reorientation Program for German Prisoners o f War, dated
31 May 1945. The policy directive further underlines that the basic educational program
in each camp, in addition to English, is to consist of United States history, United States
civics, and commercial geography of the United States. "Correspondence courses from
universities except those pertaining to the English language and American history will
be discouraged."
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prisoner-students were separated into groups of eight or nine men under the tutelage of
one or two language instructors. Each prisoner received two hours of formal instruction
and engaged in two hours of study each day during the course.

Formal instruction

followed an imitative technique "based on the principle that the most effective way to
learn any language is to imitate as exactly as possible what a native speaker says."8
Students who completed the Project n and in courses successfully, might still be unable
to read or write English well, but they could carry on a fairly complicated conversation
with ease.9 Further underlining the importance o f English language training, 50 percent
(192 hours) o f the total course academic hours consisted of language training.10
The classes in Military Government suffered, early on, from a lack o f materials
and especially from a lack of immediate, first-hand information and experience from
Germany. Policy fluidity in the occupied zone often made the materials studied by the
prisoner-students and the instruction presented from the platform outdated or superseded
before the students mastered the content.

Prisoner-students poured over the weekly

reports from the military government detachments in the American zone, since these
provided their first real look at the situation in defeated Germany. Another stumbling
block faced by the Military Government instructors was the discovery that most o f the

8 HM F 4-4.1, March 1, 1946. 8. The imitative principle produced some interesting
results. Years after World W ar n, a traveler might encounter a German whose spoken
English was marked by a Mississippi drawl. The incongruous drawl could be attributed
often to the fact that the German had learned English as a prisoner of war picking cotton
in Mississippi or from an American Army instructor from Mississippi.
9 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 131.
10 RG 389, PMG, Box 1633 (File 350, General). Curriculum Listing, Class #2,
Police School, September 1945.
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prisoners were, to an amazing degree, ignorant o f the political, legal, and financial
structures of their own country. Addition to the faculty o f officers with recent military
government experience improved instruction as the Project n and ID effort matured.11
Except for the guard towers and barbed-wire restricting the prisoner-student’s
movement and the uniforms each wore with the letters "PW" emblazoned in white paint,
the schools at Forts Getty and Wetherill appeared no different from the myriad schools
operating to train, field, and sustain the massive U. S. Army o f 1945. The system used
to teach the prisoners English followed the same steps used to train American soldiers
as linguists and many of their classes in military government used the same materials
employed to train US Army personnel for duty in occupied Germany.
The uniqueness of the Project II and III effort is appreciated when one looks at
the Army’s approach to the assigned mission to train the selected prisoners in the
principles of democracy. At a time, almost 50 years later when the history profession
debates the merits of ethno-centric/gender-centric courses and "politically correct"
teaching, it is enlightening to look at how the scholars assigned to teach democratic
thought to the German prisoners in Projects II and HI sought to accomplish their assigned
task and what facets of the American story they considered essential in imparting the
spirit of American democracy. One must appreciate the magnitude of their task. The
modern-day scholar/teacher faces students who, while they might be indifferent for the
most part, have a command of the English language and have grown up in an atmosphere
o f democracy and freedom.

The scholars teaching democratic ideals to the

11 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners o f War, undated. 4.
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prisoner-students faced men whose comprehension of the nuances o f spoken and written
English varied greatly.

Further, although, the prisoners selected for training were

overtly anti-Nazi, this did not make them pro-democracy. They had little experience in
democracy and freedom since most had grown to maturity in a traditionally authoritarian
society that had flirted with a vestige of democracy during the tumultuous years after
World War I, only to be hypnotized by Hitler, the Fuhrer mystique, and the
totalitarianism of National Socialism. Faced with the contradiction o f teaching the spirit
o f freedom to men guarded inside barbed-wire compounds, and facing students whose
culture harkened, pridefully, to Frederick the Great’s observation that "The only freedom
for the Prussian was the libertas oboedieruiae - the freedom to obey,"12 teaching
democratic ideals was no easy undertaking.
The first step was establishing an atmosphere o f free, democratic cooperation
between the officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel of the school instructional
staff. The ideals of the school necessitated some disregard o f the formalities of military
rank and the gulf between prisoner and captor.13 The casualness by which the officers
and teachers regarded their rank and their commitment to placing the mission and
professional expertise above rank protocol, impressed the status-conscious German
prisoners and contributed to an end of elitism inbred in the German Army.14 They were
suspicious, and being intelligent men, were quick to recognize propaganda. As expressed

12 Walter L. Dorn, Competition For Empire 1740-1763 (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1940). 62.
13 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946. 7.
14 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 125.
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by Dr. Jones, success depended greatly on an engendered spirit of trust at the school:
Once accepted at the school, the prisoner must be thoroughly trusted.
There is no middle ground between confidence and mistrust if the school
is to succeed. Suspected prisoners, if any should slip through the
screening process, must be quietly sent away without impairing the
general feeling of friendliness and good w ill.15
The duty o f the School Center, as envisioned by the instructors, was to provide
the atmosphere in which students might sense and appreciate the attitudes and convictions
which Americans associate with democratic ideals and actions. Exposing the prisoners
to democratic attitudes and convictions was an especially difficult task because it involved
intangible factors.

The consensus of the staff was that, although democracy cannot

always be taught, its spirit can be absorbed.

The faculty strove to build student

confidence in themselves and in the staff. To plant the seed of freedom and a taste of
the American attitude towards liberty of expression, the staff sought to reproduce the free
and informal classroom atmosphere of an American school or university. The right to
hold individual opinions was emphasized; analysis and criticism were encouraged during
group discussions.16
Teaching democratic principles by making a direct assault on German
preconceptions in the name of democracy seemed injudicious. The staff attacked the
same end by indirection, teaching both German and American history.

Dr. Jones

described the approach:

15 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners o f War, undated, 7. Despite the spirit o f trust sought, the faculty was not
beyond using "student-informants" to report on after-hours discussions among the
prisoners on the effectiveness of classes presented. See: Ibid.. 21.

16 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946, 16.
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In view of Nazi perversion of German history and of the history of
western Europe, it was decided to teach German history, at least since the
Peace of Westphalia, with a view to examining its democratic tendencies
and assessing their strength and their weakness, for the thesis cannot be
defended that Germany alone is incapable o f democratic growth . . . it
was decided to erect a second course discussing characteristic American
institutions like the constitution, the party system, American education,
labor unions, and the like, in their historical setting. Here the theme was
that the United States, with many and grievous faults, yet afforded the
world the prospect o f democracy that had succeeded. In the spirit of
"look now upon this picture, then on this," the parallel courses aimed to
arouse an interest in the democratic philosophy, defined as individual
self-respect and a sense of common brotherhood.17
Dr. Henry W. Ehrmann, along with four German-speaking instructors and two
prisoner assistants, taught the German history classes.

These classes, conducted in

German, were the focus of the first four weeks of each training cycle. Interestingly, the
instructors employed American rather than German methods of teaching history, stressing
politico-economic and social developments rather than the history of wars and dynasties.
The course stressed the two main aspects of German history:
authoritarian and the liberal-democratic trends.

the reactionary-

The lectures attempted to give the

students a clearer understanding of the origins o f the dictatorial regime they had lived
through, devoting particular attention to the destruction of historical myths and the
concepts responsible for arrogant and chauvinistic attitudes.

Germany’s democratic

traditions were underlined in an attempt to convince the prisoners that, while assisting
the Military Government authorities in building a democratic Germany, they could revive
some of the traditions of their own national history and not be compelled to import ideas

17 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners of W ar, undated. 5.
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and institutions from the outside.18
Time

limitations dictated

the Treaty

of Westphalia and

the rise

of

Brandenburg-Prussia as the starting point for the lectures on German history. Lecturers
described The Revolution of 1848 as one of the catastrophes of German history, a noble,
though belated effort on the part of the middle classes to assert themselves by achieving
liberty and unity.19

The course focused the greater portion of its content on a

particularly precise account of World War I and the reasons for Germany’s defeat and
the history of the successor German republic.

In discussing Germany’s democratic

experience, stress was laid on the condition of local self-government, labor relations, and
the slow, but steady, improvement of Germany’s international position between 1919 and
1933.

The lectures attributed the eventual failure of the Weimar Republic to the

breakdown o f the technicality of compromise on which German democracy, like any
other, had to rely for the solution to conflicts.20 The instructors had to overcome the
prisoner-students’ general reluctance to deal with German history. Many preferred to
center their discussions around spiritual and intellectual developments (German idealism,
philosophic problems) rather than on the less enjoyable features of German social and

18 Ibid., 10, 17. Despite the intellectual prowess of most of the prisoners selected for
training, the entrance tests showed a striking lack o f knowledge o f basic German history.
Fifty percent of the candidates for the Administrative School were unable to identify the
Paulskirche in Frankfurt, symbol of the Revolution o f 1848, or Rudolf Virchow,
Bismark’s liberal antagonist. Over half did not recognize the name of Hugo Preuss,
father o f the Weimar Constitution. See: Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 126.
19 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected
German Prisoners o f War, undated, 18.
20 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946. 11.
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political history.21
Dr. (Colonel) T. V. Smith led an instructional staff o f four officers and six
discussion group leaders teaching the follow-on four week course in American history
and the principles of democracy. Recognizing that democracy does not take hold unless
men admire it, the staff put together a mixture of classes calculated to appeal to Germans
- politics, institutions, sociology, linguistics, and philosophy - in an effort to "dazzle" the
prisoners with the magnificence o f the democratic way o f life.

"Democracy was

presented not as a political system free from difficulties but as a system which had been
successful in fulfilling man’s aspirations for a free and happy life and as a real challenge
to the German people. "22
The instructors presented all lectures on American history in English. Howard
Mumford Jones, the School Center’s director of education, noted the communications
problems inherent in teaching a course in American history to a foreign audience:
An American who wants to explain democracy to the Germans
sometimes finds himself a little baffled. He can, of course, begin with the
Declaration of Independence and go to the Constitution and the Gettysburg
Address. He can do this in English or he can do it in German. Somehow
it seems better, whenever possible, to use the English texts: the
Constitution in German translation suffers a weird sea-change into political
metaphysics, once it passes into the penumbra of the awful German
language. But if he sticks to the English texts, he finds he has to explain
an eighteenth-century or a biblical vocabulary to readers o f limited
English.
If he then turns to some handbooks on citizenship published by the
government or by some of the admirable agencies that try to help the

21 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners o f War, undated, 20. Many o f the prisoners confessed to being "fed-up" with
the problems concerning their own country. They considered it much more important
to learn as much as possible about the United States and perfect their English.

22 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946. 12.
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newcomer, he finds these are not designed for his needs. Most o f these
handbooks were meant for adults o f meager literacy, and some of the
writing is, or has to be, infantile. Germans have been accused o f many
faults, but illiteracy has never been one of them.23
Instructors had to be mindful that the prisoner-students were learning English
simultaneously with their classes in American history. This slowed the process initially.
Lectures were often thrown off schedule by the lecture-discussion method. The value
o f lively discussion was felt to be superior to the value o f any straight lecture
presentation. When a given topic proved of sufficient interest to excite discussion, the
instructors sacrificed the formal lecture.
A. major consideration which guided the construction and presentation of the
course was a realization that most American histories are written for Americans,
containing a thousand allusions of interest to Americans but of no real meaning to
Europeans.

Bearing in mind that the course was not primarily a course in American

history, but a course in re-orienting a defeated enemy, the staff focused the lecture series
on the development of characteristic American institutions in their time and place, rather
than a chronological history. In Dr. Jones’s words: "Whole areas of the history of the
United States were swept over in a fashion that would make orthodox historians gasp."24

23 Howard Mumford Jones, "Writers and American Values," New York Times Book
Review. August 5, 1945, 12. Dr. Jones’s critique of American writing has a ring of
truth 47 years later. He went on to state: "Some Americans have, indeed, tried to clarify
and simplify the cannons of the democratic way of life...it is...unfortunate...our
intellectual advance guard has too often been concerned with the intricacies of the literary
process than with substantive results...it has not eloquently produced what it needs to
produce, a series o f masterly and simple statements o f the American way o f life today."
24 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners o f War, undated, 25-26. The first text employed in the course was a
translation of James Truslow Adams’s The Epic of America (Der Aufsteig Amerikas vom
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While the course outline called for 20 two-hour lecture/discussion sessions,
language problems and the time given over to discussion often prevented completion of
the full 20 lecture series for any of the classes in Projects II and III. Students received
printed English outlines prior to each class session along with advance reading and study
assignments. A condensed version of the American Constitution was also distributed for
study and appraisal. Ten-minute quizzes, in English and in German, opened many of the
sessions.

Hour-long tests, at least as severe as college examinations, were given

periodically. The staff conducted voluntary evening reviews and discussions for those
students seeking additional help. The prisoners usually spent their Saturday afternoons
preparing special reports and papers assigned during their classes.25
The American history classes began with a presentation on the geography of the
United States.

Dr. Jones designed the geography lecture specifically to impress the

prisoners with the vastness and resources of the country; the first lecture’s maps aided
the learning of English. Lecture 2 focused on the great New World empires, comparing
the feudalism o f the French and Spanish colonies with the relative modernity of the
British colonial system. Lecture 3 covered the English colonies in more detail, tracing
the slow and painful growth of the political institutions and customs reflected in the
American Constitution.

Lecture 4 discussed the events leading to the American

Land der indianer zum Welfreichi.
Nevins and Commanger’s Pocket History of the United States, an Office of War
Information booklet entitled An American Handbook, and the three Jones-authored
pamphlets - An Introduction to American Schools. An Introduction to American
Government, and A Brief History of the United States - were added. See: Gansburg,
Stalag: U .S .A .. 128.
25 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected
German Prisoners o f W ar, undated, 5.
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Revolution, pointing out that the Revolution was partly a function o f the modernization
of western Europe and partly a function of the new frontier. Lecture 5 analyzed the
Declaration of Independence from a philosophical view rather from the aspect of than the
document’s political import. Lectures 6 and 7 which were analyses of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights proved to be by far two of the most successful units of instruction.
Both sessions focused on the contrast between eighteenth-century assumptions and
twentieth-century development and practices. The eighth lecture traced the country’s
development through the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, contrasting eighteenth-century
America with the tumultuous world of the American frontier. Lecture 9 looked at the
American party system emerging into its modem function under Jackson and followed
the development of the party system into the twentieth-century.26
The next two lectures in the series, covering issues leading to and the conduct of
the Civil War, prompted the most pointed and threatening questions in the American
history course. Students always mentioned the contradiction between democratic ideals
and freedom and the facts of slavery, racism, and racial segregation and often, defiantly
questioned the instructors. The reality of overt racial prejudice and discrimination in
most areas of the country was not lost on the German prisoners who were quick to point
out the discrepancy between American pretense and practice.27 The subject of the status

26 Ibid., 26.
27 Lloyd Brown, a black soldier, recalled his treatment in Salina, Kansas, during
World W ar II:
As we entered, the counterman hurried to the rear to get the owner,
who hurried out front to tell us with urgent politeness: "You boys know
we don’t serve colored here."
O f course we knew it. They didn’t serve "colored" anywhere in town
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and treatment o f blacks in American society plagued the re-education effort, not only at
Forts Getty and Wetherill, but also throughout the camp system. Most instructors found
it extremely difficult to answer the prisoners’ pointed questioning.

T. V. Smith, a

southerner and leader of the American history instruction team for Projects II and HI,
related his method o f answering the prisoners’ discomforting questions on American
racial policy and practice:
I was content (1) to point to its history, (2) to parade the progress that the
Negroes have made since slavery, and (3) to ask for suggestions from
them as to how we Americans can move faster and more securely in
solving our major "minority problems." There was never any pretense on
my part that "democracy" is not fascism to our Negroes in certain sections
and at certain times.28
Lecture 12 covered Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. Here "historical" history
folded into an examination of institutional development. Discussion o f the Gilded Age,
presented as a time of weakness which the republic survived, led naturally into Lecture
13 which was a thorough study of American education. The modem educational system

.... The best movie in town did not admit Negroes .... There was no
room at the inn for a black visitor, and there was no place ... where he
could get a cup o f coffee.
"You know we don’t serve colored here," the man repeated...
We ignored him, and just stood there inside the door, staring at what
we had come to see—the German prisoners of war who were having lunch
at the counter.
We continued to stare. This was really happening. It was no jive
talk. The people of Salina would serve these enemy soldiers and turn
away black American G .I.’s.
If we were untermenschen in Nazi Germany, they would break our
bones. As "colored" men in Salina, they only break our hearts.
See: John Morton Blum, V Was For Victory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Publishers, 1976), 191.
28 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 129.
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in the United States was presented as an important legacy from the despised Gilded Age.
Lecture 14 covered the rise of big business, climaxing in "Fordism" and Lecture 15
discussed the American labor movement.

Lecture 16 in the series addressed the

immigration problem which again, usually, aroused uncomfortable discussions on racial
and religious tensions.
Usually crowded out o f the course were the lectures on the historical relationship
between the United States and Germany, intolerance, and contemporary American life.
Regardless of how far an instructor proceeded through the prepared lectures, the
concluding lecture was usually one entitled "Misunderstanding the United States." Here,
the lecturer addressed the sources of European misinterpretation o f American thought and
policy and suggested ways of making better estimates o f the drift of American
opinion.29
The Police School (Project III) abbreviated the courses in German and American
history to enable its faculty o f 11 officers and one civilian to concentrate their efforts
toward imparting to their students an understanding of the organization and operation of
police forces in a democratic state, the duties of a police officer in a democratic
community, and the techniques and skills of police duty. The exposure of the students
to democratic thoughts and ideals in the history classes undoubtedly contributed to their
understanding o f the role of the police in a democracy which the instructors were trying
to engender.30 O f the 384 hours of training prescribed for the student-prisoners selected

29 RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected German
Prisoners of War, undated, 25-26.
30 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946, 14.

67
for police training, only 32 concentrated on German and American history. The major
focus of the school was English language training (192 hours), followed closely by
classes in police work (Basic Police - 80 hours, Police Administration - 6 hours, Legal
Subjects - 26 hours, Criminal Investigation - 18 hours).31
Because the prisoners selected for training at Fort Wetherill (Project III) were
expected to become policemen, to assist the Military Government, they were more
carefully screened than those selected for the Administrative School (Project II). Upon
arrival at Wetherill, each took a polygraph examination. After having the lie-detector
explained and being encouraged to be truthful, the machine operator asked each prisoner
a series of 20 questions ranging from "Were you ever a member of the Nazi Party?" to
"Do you advocate Communism for Germany?" Students, especially those rejected for
the course after arriving at Fort Wetherill, were vociferous in their condemnation of the
polygraph.

A number were rejected after their lie-detector tests indicated they were

covering past cooperation with the Nazi regime.

A goodly number failed for having

"Communist leanings.1,32

31 RG 389, PMG, Box 1633 (File 350). Class #2, Police School, September 1945.
32 Gansburg, Stalag: U .S .A .. 132-133. American fixation on the stigma of
"Communist leanings" began to stir in the euphoria of the Allied victory in Europe. The
instructors at the schools were faced with handling delicate political questions from the
prisoners: " The question o f Soviet Russia is continuously on the minds o f the
prisoners...for the majority it is one of fear and suspicion. From the very fact that the
school is training only students for the American zone of occupation, the students gain
the impression that they m ay...form the spearhead o f an anti-Soviet campaign of the
Western Allies in a conflict many o f them consider unavoidable." The instructional staff
decided to handle the prisoners’ fears as openly as possible, stressing that a major
conflict between Soviet Russia and the Western Allies was neither necessary nor even
likely. See: RG 389, PMG, Box 1654. Report on the Experimental School for Selected
German Prisoners o f War, undated, 23.
A number o f the dedicated instructors working the re-education program for the
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Of the 3,711 prisoners originally selected for training in Projects II and III, 1,166
successfully completed the training. Upon graduation, each class was shipped home to
Germany. Not all secured positions in military government. A measure of the success
of Projects II and ffl’s ideological aims was never made.

Nonetheless, the training

undoubtedly stirred the imagination, aroused the hopes, and developed some sense of
individual and group responsibility among the prisoner students.33

Fort Eustis - "The Six-Dav Bicycle Race”
The uncertainties and anxieties of life as a German prisoner of war in the United
States became even more pronounced after the end o f the war on May 8, 1945. Outrage
over the harsh treatment of Allied prisoners at the hands o f the Nazis and the brutality
of the extermination camps renewed demands for a crackdown on German prisoners.
With the concern over retribution against U. S. prisoners past, the government cut
rations, curtailed the canteens, and increased work quotas. The months between the end
o f the war and repatriation were hard times for most prisoners. The harsher treatment
added to the depression many felt over the loss of the war and the guilt of having
survived, most quite comfortably, when so many o f their comrades and relatives had
perished. Anxiety over the fate of relatives was almost overpowering for some. Earlier
in the war, the prisoners had been allowed correspondence from home; the catastrophic
destruction and displacement o f peoples during the last months o f the war ended virtually

Special Projects Division, tarred with the "Communist leanings" brush, were investigated
by Army Counter-Intelligence. See: Gansburg: Stalag: U .S .A .. 171-173.

33 HMF 4-4.1, March 1, 1946, 15-17.
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all contacts with families. Uncertainty over their own futures plagued most prisoners.
Rumors were rampant in all of the camps: They would be sent home immediately. They
would be turned over to the Russians, etc., etc.34
The repatriation schedule was determined by the availability o f civilians to
perform the work being done by the prisoners, the reduction in labor demands with the
surrender of Japan, the capability and willingness of the Allied military government to
absorb the returning prisoners (many o f whom were unrepentant Nazis) into the defeated
German population, and the availability of shipping to return them to Europe.

The

seemingly endless delays in the prisoners’ departure for home were extremely
frustrating.35 For about 25,000 specially selected prisoners, however, early repatriation
became a reality as a result of a third re-education "special project" conceived by the
Provost Marshal’s staff.
The Department of State made an agreement with France in the summer o f 1945,
to turn over the German prisoners interned in the United States as labor battalions to aid
in the reconstruction of that country. The men of the Special Projects Division believed
that returning the more cooperative and anti-Nazi prisoners to France as laborers would
negate any positive results obtained through the re-education program; those prisoners
could better be used in constructing a democratic Germany rather than slipping into

34 Allen V. Koop, Stark Decency: German Prisoners o f W ar in a New England
Village. 105.
35 Lewis, Utilization History. 172.
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resentment and bitterness rebuilding war-damaged France.36 After coordination with
American military government in Germany, the Army decided in December 1945 to
select approximately 25,000 German prisoners who were favorably inclined toward
democracy for direct repatriation back to Germany after a special re-orientation course.
A quick survey of available camp facilities pointed to Fort Eustis, Virginia, as the
site best suited for the training. The partially vacant prisoner o f war camp at Eustis had
a capacity to house, feed, and process approximately 8,000 prisoners, well above the
2,000 expected weekly during the training. Fort Eustis offered the added advantage of
being close to East Coast ports of embarkation. Projects II and III were terminated and
virtually the entire Special Projects team from Forts Getty and Wetherill transferred to
Fort Eustis.

Colonel Alpheus Smith, a former professor at Northwestern University,

assumed command of the new Special Projects Center, continuing the role he held at
Forts Getty and Wetherill. Twenty-five officers and 50 enlisted men (mostly German
linguists), hand-picked from the best Assistant Executive Officers and their enlisted
assistants experienced in the re-education program at various camps, augmented the
Special Projects team in preparing to receive the first 2,000 prisoners for training on
January 4, 1946.37

36 W ar Department. Special Studies Division. Re-education of German Prisoners of
War. Eustis Project. Historical Monograph File 4-4.1 (Washington, D .C .: Office o f the
Chief of Military History, 4 April 1946). 1-2. Hereafter cited as: HMF 4-4.1, April 4,
1946.
37 RG 389, PMG, Box 1626. Memorandum from Acting Provost Marshall General
to A C ofS,G l, Subject: Special Screening o f Cooperative German Prisoners of War,
undated, 1-2. In ibid..Box 1613. Adjutant General letter establishing Special Projects
Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 19 December 1945. Dr. Howard Mumford Jones did not
accompany the Project II and III staff to Fort Eustis. He left the program at Fort Getty.
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Time constraints did not allow the detailed screening and testing process which
had been used in selecting the prisoner-students for Projects II and III. The nine Service
Commands received proportionate quotas and guidance for their camp commanders’
selection of 25,000 "special prisoners" for the Eustis re-orientation program.

The

selection guidance indicated that those prisoners selected had to fall into one of the
following categories:
(1) Prisoners . . . who have been persecuted for religious, racial, or
political reasons by the Nazi regime, especially those interned in
concentration camps or prisons for those reasons; (2) Former members of
labor organizations opposed to Nazism; (3) Former members of parties or
organizations who conducted opposition against the Hitler regime; (4)
Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish (if any) prisoners . . . who continued
membership in their established church; (5) Prisoners who have shown a
cooperative attitude, have given proof that they are democratically inclined
and have not expressed hostility towards the allied purpose in
Germany.38
A prisoner’s chances for selection were improved by having completed a
camp-level re-education program, being physically healthy, and able to understand
English. Any prisoner with a record of active Nazi involvement, e.g., Allgemeine-SS,

Jones, while a brilliant scholar, must have been temperamental. "Colonel Alpheus Smith
and Dr. Jones came in yesterday and we had several conferences. Dr. Jones has
resigned regularly once a week since you left, but I think he is too much interested in
the program [and] that we can persuade him to stay." See: In ibid.. Box1626 (File
314.7). Letter: MG Archer Lerch to LTC Edward Davidson, 25 July 1945.
38 Ibid., Box 1626. Letter, Office of the Adjutant General to Commanding Generals,
First through Ninth Service Commands, Subject: Screening of Cooperative Prisoners of
W ar, December, 1945, 5-7.
The letter, early-on, states: "This screening has the highest priority and will be given
precedence over all prisoner o f war programs except the work program (underline
added)."
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Waffen-SS, Gestapo, et. al. was automatically excluded.39
Each prisoner selected by his camp commanders filled out a lengthy questionnaire
designed by The Factory to reveal those who knew the most about Germany’s democratic
traditions and to uncover any hidden Nazi beliefs. The completed questionnaires, carried
by courier to Fort Kearney, were screened and evaluated by a team at The Factory. The
screening team members, many former concentration camp inmates with extensive
experience with Nazis and Nazi organizations, skilled in detecting subterfuges used by
Nazis to conceal their political attitudes and backgrounds, worked around the clock to
complete the task.

Based on their screening and evaluation, the records o f selected

prisoners were divided into three groups: White (confirmed anti-Nazi, acceptable), Grey
(undecided), and Black (obdurate Nazi, unacceptable). After categorization, the records
and questionnaires were couriered to the Special Projects Center at Fort Eustis. When
a shipment o f selected prisoners arrived at the Center, they were marched immediately

39 Ibid., 7-8. Specifically excluded were all prisoners who were former members of:
Allgemeine SS (Schutzstaffel), Waffen-SS (Combat SS), Sd (Sicherheitsdienst), SA
(Sturmabteilung), Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei), Grepo (Grenzpolizei), RSHA
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt), GFP (Secret Field Police), HI (Hitler Jugend, officers
only), NSKK (NationalsozialistischeKraftfahr-Korps), NSFK (National Socialist Aviation
Corps), RAD (Compulsory Labor Service, officers only). Any member o f the Nazi
Party, Elite University Student Corps, career officers, regardless of rank, all officers
above the rank o f Major, graduates of any Nazi military academy, along with members
o f the German Christian Movement (Deutsche Christen Bewegung) and the "Neo-Pagan”
Movement (Deutsches Glanbensbewegung) were also excluded automatically.
The W ar Department exclusion categories were virtually the same as those developed
from independent psychological screening of selected prisoners of war in early 1945.
See: RG 389, PMG, Box 1630 (File 337.0). Memorandum: Report of Conference with
Mrs. Eugene Meyer, 10 September 1945.
Despite the detailed screening instructions, a number of prisoners who should have
been excluded because of their Nazi beliefs faked their way through the Eustis program.
See: Robert Lowe Kunzig, ”360,000 P .W .’S - The Hope of Germany," The American
Magazine, vol. 145, no.5, November 1946, 135.
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to a processing center where the three categories were separated, "Whites" entered the
Special Projects compound to begin the re-orientation course; "Blacks" were dispatched
to the regular prisoner o f war compound at Fort Eustis; and the "Greys" were segregated
for a more detailed interview by intelligence personnel at an auxiliary compound. Those
"Greys" whose re-interview indicated anti-Nazi beliefs joined a re-orientation course and
gained early repatriation while those "Greys" who turned "Black" found themselves back
in the regular prisoner o f war routine with no hope o f accelerated release. Only 8.7%
of all the prisoners sent to the Special Projects Center were rejected.40
The 12 six-day training cycles ran from January 4, 1946; the last one ended on
April 5, 1946.

In that three month period, 23,147 prisoners went through the

re-orientation training cycles at Fort Eustis, roughly 2,OCX) men at a time.41

The

"six-day bicycle race," as the prisoners referred to the course, was a marvel of logistics,
coordination, and timing. At any given period during the training, 4,000-plus prisoners
were either in-processing, attending classes, or preparing for departure. Having learned
from some of the inefficiencies o f Projects II and III, the Special Projects team refined
the Fort Eustis operation to insure that the Germans departed with a sense that the
organizations in a democracy could function with precision and efficiency.
The staff streamlined and condensed the 34 lectures in German and American
history. Nine 35-mm films, selected to support the contents o f the lectures, were integral

40 HMF 4-4.1, April 4, 1944, 6-9.
41 RG 389, PMG, Box 1613 (Fort Eustis-File 4). Schedule o f Training Cycles,
Special Projects Center, 11 February 1946.
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to the training program.42

The six-day cycles revolved around the following 12

presentations:
1. The Democratic Way of Life.
2. The Constitution of the United States.
3. Political Parties, Elections, and Parliamentary Procedures.
4. Education in the United States.
5. American Family Life.
6. The American Economic Scene.
7. American Military Government.
8.' Democratic Traditions in Germany.
9. Why the Weimar Republic Failed-I.
10. Why the Weimar Republic Failed-II.
11. The World of Today and Germany.
12. New Democratic Trends in the World Today.
Colonel Alpheus Smith opened each cycle opened with an address which set the
purpose and tone for the six days of training to follow. Quentin Reynolds, after touring
the Special Projects Center, reported hearing a prisoner commenting on Smith’s
presentation:

42 Ibid., Box 1613 (Fort Eustis-File 11). Interim Report o f the Orientation Branch,
Special Projects Division, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 28 February 1946, 3.
The Special Projects staff evidently learned from experience. A review of the
outlines and scripts for the 12 lectures shows that any reference to race relations, which
might elicit pointed questions from the prisoners, have been omitted.
The films were: Abe Lincoln in Illinois. The River. Tuesday in November (in
German), American Romance. Power and the Land. The Seventh Cross. TV A (in
German), Toscanini (in German), Displaced Persons in Europe.
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He didn’t pull his punches, much to our surprise, that American
democracy wasn’t perfect. But he said that the trouble wasn’t with
democracy; the trouble was with some Americans. Some self-styled
American leaders and their followers, he said, ought to start practicing
democracy. Then he told us about the great benefits that Americans have,
and he told us that a few bad Americans, a few bad things in America
haven’t spoiled democracy and can’t spoil it, and finally he said that
democracy was the best thing there is in human society. H e’s got
something there.43
The prisoners’ days at the Special Project Center were busy, almost hectic; all
scheduled activities before 5:00 p.m . were required.

Each day of the cycle, the

prisoner-students, divided into two groups of a thousand each, attended two lectures, at
least one film, and two discussion group sessions based on the subjects of the day’s
lectures. The Personal Problems staff presented a special lecture on current conditions
in Germany and reserved time during the evenings for those prisoners who wanted to
discuss problems, mainly fears about repatriation. Prisoners in the pools awaiting a new
class cycle or debarkation processing were occupied by a series o f additional movies and
35-mm film strips, a music program with over 50 recorded hour-long music programs
covering a gamut of tastes (e.g. Oklahoma Album. Popular Songs in German. Music of
the Opera. Radio Symphonies of America. German Chamber Music. Shostakovich
Symphony N o.51. and organized athletics.44
Each class was sent home immediately upon graduation. For some unexplained

43 Quentin Reynolds, "Experiment in Democracy,” Collier’s. May 25, 1946, 41.
44 Rg 389, PMG, Box 1613 (Fort Eustis - File 11). Interim Report of the Orientation
Branch, Special Projects Division, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 28 February 1946, Tab E,
Exhibits 1,2,3; Tab F.
The Special Project Center library stocked an array of
current American and German periodicals, 1200 English language books on history and
government, and 1200 German language books ranging from histories to fiction. The
well-stocked canteen carried copies of all the books in the Buecherriehe Neue Welt (New
World Library! series for sale.
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reason, considering Fort Eustis’s proximity to the ports o f Hampton Roads and Norfolk,
most were moved by train to New York City where they boarded Victory ships. Each
group was escorted by a member o f the Special Projects Division staff or a former
Assistant Executive Officer to insure that, as "special prisoners," they were kept separate
from regular PW ’s, and cleared through France to Germany expeditiously.45
The Factory ceased operations in January 1946. Many of its German prisoners,
who had worked with great diligence and dedication supporting the re-education program,
transferred to Fort Eustis to support the re-orientation program there. Project II and
Project III work at Forts Getty and Wetherill terminated in March 1946. P e r RuPs last
published issue was #26, predated 1 April 1946. The last class in "the six-day bicycle
race" graduated on April 4, 1946. With the closing o f the Special Projects Center at
Fort Eustis on April 8, 1946, the re-education program for German prisoners of war held
in the United States during World War II ended.46

45 Ibid., Box 1627(Escort Reports - File 319.1).

46 Ibid., Box 1613. Memorandum, Subject: Liquidation of Factory, 21 January 1946.

CONCLUSION
The handling, care and treatment of enemy prisoners of war have been integral
to every war the United States has fought. On balance, this country has always tried to
comply with accepted customs and international law dealing with prisoners o f war. The
holding o f approximately 372,000 German prisoners o f war in the United States during
World W ar II, by the very magnitude of the task, was an unique experience. Although
there had been some pre-war planning in anticipation o f the problem, and although the
Geneva Convention of 1929 provided a framework within which to operate, American
policies governing the administration of the prisoner o f war program evolved through
trial an^error. The government may be faulted for being slow to recognize the power of
the Nazis in the camps and for its early stumbling attempts to counter their dominance
of the prisoner population. But it should be noted that the Army’s full concentration was
focused on fighting the war across two oceans and its initial willingness to accept a
trade-off of continuing Nazi influence for good law and order in the camps was
understandable. By the end of the war the program was running smoothly.
After overcoming early obstacles and internal security fears the United Stated
made maximum use of the labor potential of the German prisoners of war. Prisoner
labor helped offset manpower shortages encountered in the United States after 1943.
Especially in the agricultural sector, prisoner labor made a major contribution to the
successful prosecution of the war.

Furthermore, the program was a bargain for the

American taxpayer: revenue generated from the prisoner of war fimd - movies, canteen
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sales, etc. - covered the full costs o f the program. In fact, the program turned a profit.1
In comparison to the treatment of U. S. prisoners of war in the hands of the
Nazis, German prisoners may have been "coddled."2

The United States’ strict

compliance with the Geneva Convention did not insure reciprocal treatment o f our
prisoners by German authorities. Nonetheless, it was the morally correct policy. While
some of the harsh treatment of American POWs may be attributed to Nazism’s brutal
philosophy, their treatment mainly reflects the shortcomings o f the Geneva Convention
of 1929 in the context of total war.

Furthermore, in the later stages of the war the

German people and soldiers ate little better than the Allied prisoners o f war.

It is

unrealistic and idealistic to expect a belligerent power fighting for its very existence, to
feed, clothe and house enemy prisoners o f war in a fashion better than it could provide
its own people.
The prisoner re-education program showed vision; however, its effectiveness has
never been measured. Surveys of prisoners graduating from Projects II and III and the
Fort Eustis Special Projects Center reflect a preponderance o f favorable opinion about

1 RG 389, PMG, Box 1613.
Fund, 9 January 1946.

Memorandum, Subject:

Central Prisoner o f War

2 An ex-prisoner described his captivity in the United States:
Our treatment was first class. I was even able to continue my geological
studies and take my exam before a Swiss commission. We didn’t have to
work, it was on a voluntary basis. I did work and earned so much money
that I was able to buy all the books for my studies and have suits made at
the tailors.
See: Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander. 281.
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the training and inculcation of democratic precepts.3 The prisoners’ positive statements
must be considered in the light of their early repatriation and a possible unwillingness to
express any view which would prompt their captors to delay release.

A survey of

ex-special prisoners who could be located in the Baden-Wiirttemburg area of the
American zone o f occupation in 1947 showed a significant revelation:
German prisoners of war returning from America showed more insight
into current German problems and had more commendable attitude toward
the necessity for political re-orientation of a nazi-steeped Germany than
the German population as a whole. However, the schooling in democratic
principles that most of these men received before being repatriated was in
real danger of being forgotten as the returned soldiers were confronted by
a hard and unsympathetic environment in which fellow-citizens approached
their problems from an individualistic rather than a social viewpoint.4
The re-education program ("intellectual diversions") was technically a violation
o f the Geneva Convention as the United States was teaching the democratic political
philosophy. But since the Allies won the war, who was to call this a violation? On the
other hand, disregard for the Convention may have haunted the United States during the
1950’s with the "brain-washing" of American prisoners held by the Communists during
the Korean War.
In great measure, the success realized from the re-education program is a credit
to the dedication, professionalism and vision of the men o f the Special Projects Division,
the special German prisoners of war who manned The Factory, and the dedicated
scholars and Assistant Executive Officers in the outlying camps who sought to instill the

3 RG 389, PMG, Box 1613 (Fort Eustis - File 11). Interim Report o f the
Orientation Branch, Special Projects Division, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 28 February 1946,
Tab C, Exhibits 1 and 2.
4 HMF 2.3-7, September 1952, 130.

80
principles of democracy in a defeated enemy. As Dr. Moutlon, a key member of the
Special Project Division’s re-education staff stated after the war: "It was a constructive
thing to do in something as destructive as a war. "5

5 Gansburg, Stalag: U . S . A . . 180.
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